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Aleksander Surdej 
Sources of Corruption in Post-Communist Poland 
1. Introduction 
After almost a decade-long focus on the problems of gaining and maintaining public support for 
harsh economic reforms, the focus of political economists analyzing post-communist transfor-
mations has shifted to quality of governance and corruption as its most significant indicator.1 
Increasingly bad governance has been identified as the main obstacle to economic development 
and to the legitimacy of democratic government, whereas corruption has been indicated as its 
worst consequence. As a result, institutional reformers have been advised to address the issue of 
bad governance and corruption. 
In this paper I will try to contribute to the ongoing debate about corruption in post-communist 
Poland by analyzing it through the prism of state institutional weakness as identified in the 
management of the privatization process and against the backdrop of the disruptive force of 
windfall gains generated by the chaotic political and economic changes which have been taking 
place in Poland since the beginning of 1990s. 
2. Indicators of Corruption in Poland 
What is the extent of corruption in Poland nowadays?2 Which areas are plagued by corruption 
and what incentives for corruption exist in the organization of the public administration and the 
delivery of public services? Below I will present data which may help in sketching answers to 
these questions. 
2.1) Perception of Corruption 
Poles seem to be aware of the scale and gravity of corruption in Poland. The existing data show 
that Poles think that corruption is pervading the Polish state and the Polish political system.3 
                                                     
1 From a vast international literature it suffices to cite here: Susan Rose-Ackerman(1997)Corruption and Develop-
ment, paper for the World Bank Conference on Development Economics and “Corruption and Integrity Improvement 
Initiatives in Developing Countries”, UNDP, New York, 1998. The Polish language literature includes: Andrzej 
Kojder, Andrzej Sadowski(ed.)(2002) Klimaty korupcji (Climate for corruption), Semper Warszawa; Maria 
Jarosz(2001)Manowce polskiej prywatyzacji (Drawbacks of Polish privatization), PWN Warszawa or Antoni Z. 
Kamiński, Bartłomiej Kamiński(2004)Korupcja rządów (Corruption of governments), Trio Warszawa. 
2 It is interesting to notice that corruption has become a research topic and a public issue only in the late 1990s, al-
though there are good reasons to think that corruption expanded in the last years of the communist rule and later was 
additionally facilitated by the transitional chaos (some researchers prefer speaking about the systemic vacuum to 
point at the break between no longer existing old rules and not-yet established new rules) of the early 1990s. Thus the 
systematic data we have refer to the most recent period starting around 1997–98. 
3 The awareness of corruption has increased in Poland since the start of „the Rywin affair” in 2003. „The Rywin 
affair” refers to „an offer” presented by Lew Rywin – a famous film producer, to Agora Publishing Group to help 
modify a draft law on electronic media with help of his political allies for a bribe of approx. 20m USD. The offer was 
registered on tape by the editor in chief of the largest Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza – owned by Agora, and the 
registration served as the main evidence against Rywin. From an investigation of a special parliamentary investiga-
tion resulted that Rywin acted in alliance with some people close to the office of prime minister. In 2004 the court 
however sentenced only Rywin for 2 years of jail, not finding sufficient proof against his apparent fellows in corrup-
tion. 
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Table 1: Opinions about what can be arranged for money in Poland 
What do you think is possible 
to arrange in Poland for 
money (with bribes)? 
Easily Difficult Not possible 
Favorable decisions in local 
administration (in Gmina) 
71% 13% 3% 
Favorable decision in high 
governmental office 
64% 17% 4% 
Favorable press 60% 15% 4% 
Favorable sentencing in court 58% 20% 4% 
Favorable provision in 
parliamentary laws 
48% 20% 5% 
Source: Potoczny obraz korupcji (Popular image of corruption), OBOP, January 2003 
As the table above indicates, Poles are convinced that money „opens” almost all doors in Poland 
and that corruption is omnipresent. Politicians, administrators and other public functionaries 
(like judges) are perceived as corrupt, as well as journalists (who are not public functionaries).4 
Table 2: Is corruption a social problem in Poland? (Percentage of respondents answering „yes“) 
 July 1991 February 2003 
It is a very big social problem 23% 68% 
It is a rather big social 
problem 
38% 23% 
It is a rather small social 
problem 
15% 2% 
It is a very small social 
problem 
21% 0% 
Difficult to say 2% 6% 
Source: Polacy o korupcji, lobbingu i kupowaniu ustaw (Poles on corruption, lobbying and buying laws), CBOS, 
February 2003. 
Poles increasingly think that corruption is an acute social problem. Although between 1991 and 
2003 the percentage of people who think that corruption is a big social problem increased from 
71% to 81%, the share of those who think that it is a very big social problem increased from 
23% to 68%. 
The scale of corruption is better seen when societal perception is compared across nations. The 
Corruption Perception Index compiled by Transparency International shows the salience of this 
issue in international comparison. The data from 2000 and 2004 show that all post-communist 
countries are situated relatively low in this ranking, indicating that the conditions of post-
communist transformations create fertile ground for corruption. 
                                                     
4 The presence of people who are not public functionaries on this list of the corrupt seems to indicate that people 
associate corruption with actions subordinated to the power of money in general. Portraying journalists as corrupt 
people seem to indicate their mistrust of press as a conveyor of impartial information. 
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Table 3: Corruption in Poland and other post-communist countries according to Transparency 
International – The 2000 Corruption Perceptions Index 
Rank Country CPI Score Surveys Used High-Low Range 
1 Finland 10.0 8 9.0 – 10.4 
2 Denmark 9.8 9 8.6 – 10.6 
10 United Kingdom 8.7 9 7.3 – 9.7 
14 USA 7.8 10 6.2 – 9.2 
17 Germany 7.6 8 6.2 – 8.4 
27 Estonia 5.7 4 4.4 – 8.1 
28 Slovenia 5.5 6 4.1 – 7.3 
32 Hungary 5.2 10 3.9 – 8.1 
42 Czech Republic 4.3 10 3.3 – 6.2 
43 Belarus 4.1 3 3.4 – 4.9 
 El Salvador 4.1 4 2.1 – 6.2 
 Lithuania 4.1 4 3.8 – 4.4 
 Malawi 4.1 4 3.8 – 4.8 
 Poland 4.1 11 2.8 – 5.6 
52 Argentina 3.5 8 3.0 – 4.5 
 Bulgaria 3.5 6 3.3 – 4.3 
 Ghana 3.5 4 2.5 – 4.7 
 Senegal 3.5 3 2.8 – 4.3 
 Slovak Republic 3.5 7 2.2 – 6.2 
57 Latvia 3.4 3 2.1 – 4.4 
68 Romania 2.9 4 2.1 – 4.3 
87 Ukraine 1.5 7 0.5 – 2.5 
89 Yugoslavia 1.3 3 0.6 – 2.4 
90 Nigeria 1.2 4 0.6 – 2.1 
 
8 Aleksander Surdej  
The 2004 Corruption Perceptions Index 
Rank Country CPI Score Surveys Used High-Low Range 
1 Finland 9.7 9 9.5 – 9.8 
2 New Zealan 9.6 9 9.4 – 9.6 
15 Germany 8.2 11 8.0 – 8.5 
31 Estonia 6.0 12 5.6 – 6.7 
31 Slovenia 6.0 12 5.6 – 6.6 
42 Hungary 4.8 12 4.6 – 5.0 
44 Lithuania 4.6 9 4.0 – 5.4 
51 Czech Republic 4.2 11 3.7 – 4.9 
54 Bulgaria 4.1 10 3.7 – 4.6 
57 Latvia 4.0 8 3.8 – 4.3 
57 Slovakia 4.0 11 3.6 – 4.5 
64 Mexico 3.6 11 3.3 – 3.8 
67 Poland 3.5 13 3.1 – 3.9 
71 China 3.4 16 3.0 – 3.8 
74 Belarus 3.3 5 1.9 – 4.8 
87 Romania 2.9 12 2.5 – 3.4 
90 Russia 2.8 1.5 2.5 – 3.1 
122 Ukraine 2.2 10 2.0 – 2.4 
144 Nigeria 1.6 9 1.4 – 1.8 
145 Bangladesh 1.5 8 1.1 – 1.9 
Source: Transparency International (www.transparency.org) 
Notes: The CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, risk analysts and 
the general public and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). High-Low Range provides the highest 
and lowest values of the sources.  
It should be noted that the reliability of the Corruption Perception Index as a gauge of actual 
corruption is sometimes cast into doubt due to its vulnerability to the “media effect”, i.e. the 
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probability that the perceived frequency of corruption increases in periods when the media dis-
cover and highlight cases of corruption. 
An even worse scenario can be imagined: the perception of ubiquity of corruption might actu-
ally increase the number of the cases of corruption in a population composed of moral (who 
never bribe), corrupt (who always try to bribe) and opportunistic (who might equally well bribe 
as not bribe) people. When opportunistic people believe that the proportion of corrupt people 
increases, they start to think that not bribing reduces their chances of obtaining public contracts 
or public jobs. Furthermore, they become even more tempted to resort to bribery since the like-
lihood of being caught decreases with the increase of corrupt persons (assuming the amount of 
resources spent on the investigation of corruption remains constant). 
Even if these two phenomena (the „media effect“ and subsequent perception of ubiquity) can be 
shown to actually increase the extent of bribery, corruption must nevertheless be addressed pub-
licly and exposed in the press. Both effects should be taken seriously in devising the instruments 
to fight corruption. 
Although widespread, corruption is a phenomenon condemned by Polish public opinion. When 
asked whether they approve of or tolerate corruption, Poles say that corruption is a negative 
social phenomenon and as such should be fought against. 
But verbal condemnation and awareness of negative consequences of corruption are poor indi-
cators of the actual extent of a negative social phenomenon’s diffusion. It is thus useful to ana-
lyze the data about the corrupt practices most often encountered in Poland. 
2.2) Corrupt Practices 
The perception of omnipresent corruption should be compared with available data showing the 
actual incidence of corrupt behaviour. These data, although not always collected in a methodol-
ogically standard manner, show the real extent of this phenomenon. 
A 2002 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank/EBRD) survey of 
more than 3,000 firms operating in Central and Eastern Europe found that only 67 percent of 
firms in Poland never think of unofficial payments/gifts to obtain a government contract and 
72.6 percent never think of unofficial payments/gifts to deal with taxes and tax collection. The 
same study revealed that on average, bribes amounted to up to 5 percent of the annual income of 
the surveyed companies.5 
A 2000 report by the Institute of Justice (Instytut Sprawiedliwosci) found that from 1992 to 
1998 the number of bribery offenses rose by 54 percent and the offenses consisting of the use of 
public office for private gain rose by 64 percent. The same report revealed that from 1992 to 
1998 police corruption rose threefold.6 
The 2002 Batory Foundation estimated that 50 percent of Poles have participated in some type 
of corrupt activity.7 
The same institution found in 2003 that 67 percent of entrepreneurs believed that there is a „cor-
ruption tax” in the system. 
In October 2004 the Pentor survey of Polish entrepreneurs showed that 19 percent of them had 
been in situations in which a public official suggested that he expected to receive some kind of 
benefit in exchange for help in arranging a public contract or winning a public procurement.8  
                                                     
5 The Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), World Bank/EBRD http://info.world 
bank.org/governance/beeps2002. 
6 Policemen are among most corrupt professions. In 2001 Polish courts condemned 98 police functionaries and in 
2002 88 policemen were found guilty of corruption – see: Wydział łapania za rękę, in Polityka, 36/2000. 
7 After „A State of Corruption” in Poland Monthly, from September 2003, p. 12. 
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Interestingly, bribes seem to be frequent in private business dealings. The same Pentor survey 
showed that 31 percent of entrepreneurs were asked for under-the-table provisions in business-
to-business dealings. 
Despite the fact that corruption is legally punishable as a violation of articles 239, 240 and 241 
of the Polish Penal Code (Kodeks Karny)9, relatively few cases of corruption have been proc-
essed by the judicial system or ended with definite sentences (see the table below). 
Table 4: The Outcomes of Prosecuting Corruption 
Year Documented 
Corruption Crimes 
Court Corruption 
Trials 
Sentences in Corruption 
Cases 
1992 912 826 317 
1997 1171 1093 533 
Source: From Polityka, nr 14/2000. 
The data seem to indicate that corrupt practices are endemic in Poland, widespread and rooted in 
people’s behaviour.  
These conclusions, however, need some qualification. Firstly, the most diffused form of corrup-
tion in Poland seems to be so-called ”low corruption”, i.e. corruption in dealing with public 
functionaries as administrators and providers of public services. When Poles speak about their 
experiences of corruption they most often refer to paying bribes for the delivery of medical ser-
vices to which they are entitled or for passing the driving test to obtain a licence.10 It should be 
noted that in Poland the state budget finances and the public administration manages a relatively 
broad range of public services. Thus, cases of corruption were found, for instance, in the admis-
sion of students to public universities (where students have the right to study for free), but not in 
private universities (where students pay for educational services). 
As pointed out by Susan Rose-Ackerman, such corrupt practices are relatively easy to eliminate 
because citizens are asked for bribes as additional payments for services they should receive for 
free; further cases could be eliminated by a relatively simple reorganization in the way public 
services are delivered, or by reducing the scope and range of public services.11 Much more diffi-
cult to eradicate is „high corruption“ – corruption within the government or corruption resulting 
from the collusion between public officials and businesses (citizens) to create or share gains at 
the public’s expense. 
2.3) Structural Corruption 
It has been already stressed that corruption is a behavioural phenomenon. The classical use of 
this term describes corruption as „behaviour which deviates from formal duties related to a pub-
                                                                                                                                                           
8 Survey by Pentor as reported in Puls Biznesu, from 30 November 2004. 
9 The Polish Penal Code names the corruption of officials as ”passive corruption” and defines it as: a) taking material 
benefits by a person occupying public post; b) conditioning by public functionary the fulfillment of his administrative 
duty on the reception of a bribe; c) promising of material benefit dependent on the action of a public functionary; d) 
referring to one’s influence on public functionaries to resolve some problems or receive favorable decision in expec-
tation of material benefits. 
10 According to the data from the Supreme Control Chamber (NIK-Najwyzsza Izba Kontroli) 12 percent of candi-
dates said that the members of the commission for driving license suggested that the outcome of the examination 
depends on giving a bribe and 4 percent of candidate admitted giving a bribe - s. 5–6. Zagrożenia korupcją w świetle 
badań kontrolnych Najwyższej Izby Kontroli przeprowadzonych w 2002 roku (Corruption Threats in the Light of 
NIK Research). 
11 A comprehensive discussion of the way to reduce corruption can be found in Susan Rose-
Ackerman(1999)Corruption and government, Yale UP. 
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lic post (be it elected or non-elected) because of private (personal, family or clique) material or 
non-material benefits”.12 This definition confines the notion of corruption to behaviour observed 
or inferred as existing from some available indicators. 
While such an approach to corruption is laudable, it seems nevertheless worthwhile to consider 
the institutional structures themselves as prototypes which actually induce or enable corruption. 
A comprehensive analysis of this problem would call for a discussion of the meaning of good 
governance. In this paper it seems useful to narrow the issue and to distinguish institutional 
designs for state activities which: 
• impose direct costs on citizens and enterprises; 
• confer direct benefits to citizens and enterprises; 
• regulate behaviour of citizens by submitting it to procedural requirements. 
The first problem is that of organizing a specialized state administration which collects taxes 
and customs duties or enforces the standards of health or environmental protection. Public pro-
curement is another example of this type of problem. 
The second problem is the prevention of corruption in administrative units which distribute 
benefits to citizens like subsidies, allowances, health or educational services. 
The third problem is to streamline procedures in areas in which the state issues licenses or ap-
proves certain products or activities due to their importance for society. Granting marketing 
approval for medicinal products is an example of such an action.13 
The 2003 Report for the Council of Ministers lists the areas threatened by corruption in Poland 
and all of them fall within one of the three types. According to this government document the 
threat of corruption is strongest in: 
• the fiscal and customs administration (first type); 
• agricultural subsidies (second type); 
• the pharmaceutical market (third type); 
• justice and police (third type); 
• privatization (second type).14 
While the Report for the Council of Ministers has identified the areas prone to corruption, the 
Supreme Control Chamber (NIK-Najwyższa Izba Kontroli) has identified corruption areas by 
pointing to ill-designed institutions. Thus, according to the NIK analysis, corruption in Poland is 
more likely when: 
• a single public functionary has excessive power; 
• there are no precise rules for making decisions; 
• there is insufficient documentation and accounting of the decisions made and money spent; 
• internal administrative controls are weak; 
• citizens have uneven access to information; and 
• there are no mechanisms of personal responsibility.15  
                                                     
12 Joseph S. Nye(1967)Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, in American Political Sci-
ence Review, vol. 61, p. 417–427. 
13 One of pharmaceuticals companies bought a charge against an assistant to the head of the Health Minister Mariusz 
Lapiński for asking for a multimillion bribe in exchange for placing a drug on a list of drugs refunded by the National 
Health Fund. The fact was reported in an article ”Drugs for millions” (Leki za milion) in Rzeczpospolita from 12 
May 2003.  
14 Second Report on the Implementation of ”The programme to fight corruption” (Program zwalczania korupcji – 
strategia antykorupcyjna), available in the materials from 54th meeting of the Polish Parliament from 28 July 2003. 
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The identification of the instances of structural corruption should be the first step for policy 
reform. If, however, the government does not show much resolve in transforming the outcomes 
of policy analysis into institutional changes, the country could enter a vicious circle in which 
structural corruption feeds behavioural corruption, which in turn solidifies structural corruption. 
3. Factors Fuelling Corruption in Poland 
As noted earlier, researchers tend to agree and the data confirm that corruption is widespread 
and intensive in all post-communist countries. Yet to date there is no agreement as to the causes 
of such high levels of corruption. 
In the case of Poland, the discussion of the cause of corruption typically starts by pointing to 
historical and cultural factors characterizing Polish society, such as the lack of autonomy or 
statehood for over 120 years (from the end of the 18th century until 1918), followed by subordi-
nation to occupational authorities (1939–1945) and over 40 years of communist regimes during 
which the state had little social legitimacy. In this type of explanation the underlying causal 
mechanism can be summarized as follows: If the state is perceived as hostile to society, people 
approve corruption as a way of cheating and undermining the functioning of such a state. Fur-
thermore, if the patterns of corruption are firmly established they persist even if other conditions 
change; corrupt practices remain widespread even if the state has been „reclaimed” by society in 
becoming independent and democratic.16 
There is some truth to this explanation regarding the roots of corruption; some of the negative 
behavioural patterns can be traced back at least to the period of decay of communist rule in the 
1980s, during which the communist state tolerated increasing corruption in economic life and in 
the distribution of public services because it was unable to control or punish these practices. 
Yet it can be shown that corruption is better explained by certain features of the current organi-
zation of the state and public services than by remote or recent past events. Take as an example 
the fact that in the 1980s the most widespread manifestation of corruption in Poland was paying 
bribes to purchase goods which were rationed by the state, from shoes to passenger cars. This 
area of corruption was practically eradicated with a single stroke by restoring market mecha-
nisms and allowing the principles of supply and demand to set prices. 
This telling example shows that the search for the causes of corruption and for appropriate in-
struments to eliminate it should include a one-by-one examination of the typical forms of cor-
ruption and address the question of what facilitates the abuse of public office in each case. 
The task of designing appropriate institutional structures which discourage corruption may start 
with questions about the corruptive impact of some very basic features of the political system. 
To this end, Antoni Z. Kaminski and Bartlomiej Kaminski argue that the problem of political 
accountability is at the core of the corruption problem. They discuss those features of the politi-
cal system which might enhance political accountability and conclude that political accountabil-
ity is highest and corruption is lowest if the political system is of the presidential rather than the 
parliamentary type, and that the electoral rules should be of the majoritary rather than the pro-
portional kind.17 
                                                                                                                                                           
15 Zagrożenia korupcją w świetle badań kontrolnych Najwyzszej Izby Kontroli przeprowadzonych w 2002 roku 
(Corruption Threats in the Light of NIK Research), p. 4–5. 
16 For a comprehensive discussion see: William L. Miller, Ase B. Grodeland, Tatyana Y. Koshechkina(2001)A Cul-
ture of Corruption? Coping with Government in Post-Communist Europe, CEU Press, Budapest. 
17 Antoni Z. Kamiński, Bartłomiej Kamiński(2004)Korupcja rządów (Corruption of governments), Trio Warszawa, p. 
226–234. 
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Other researchers (such as Daniel Kaufman and Alexander Kaliberda18) have argued that cor-
ruption is related to the choice of basic transformation strategy, i.e. whether transition policies 
are rapid, radical and complete (RRC) or slow, shy and partial (SSP). They believe that only the 
RRC transition strategy can prevent a country from falling into a systemic rent-seeking trap, 
which fuels corruption. 
Although it seems convincing that price controls, subsidies and other forms of state intervention 
create opportunities and incentives for corruption, the peculiarity of post-communist transitions 
includes an inseparable political component, whereby the return to a market economy and de-
mocracy is necessarily by political design. Thus, the process by which the state (the govern-
ment) has managed economic transformations is a key to understanding the roots of corruption. 
In this process the state has to scale down its own size and the scope of its economic activities, 
which creates exceptional gains (as well as some losses) and, accordingly, strong incentives for 
corruption. 
Below I will try to show that opportunities for corruption and corrupt practices in Poland have 
been facilitated by the political choices regarding privatization of state-owned companies and by 
the political climate of approval (or at least tolerance of) for enrichment at the cost of the state.  
3.1 Pace of Privatization 
The initial dilemma reformers faced in all post-communist countries could be summarized as 
follows: how to privatize state-owned enterprises in the absence of sufficient capital.  
The way out of this dilemma could consist of a combination of the three privatization methods: 
• selling enterprises to foreign investors; 
• running a mass privatization program by giving away the shares to citizens; 
• selling to domestic buyers. 
Each of these methods has its advantages and disadvantages, which are already discussed in the 
voluminous literature on the privatization process in post-communist Europe. In this paper I am 
interested in the corruption potential of all three methods as revealed by the experience of priva-
tization in Poland. 
Privatization by selling to foreign buyers has created an opportunity for high corruption, that is, 
corruption at the level of government officials. Schematically the mechanisms of such corrup-
tion can be presented in this way: An announcement of an incoming large scale privatization 
used to trigger a peculiar market for privatization intermediaries who circulated among potential 
buyers offering their services under the cover of consulting, advising or lobbying. Those inter-
mediaries did not necessarily have direct contact to prime decision makers, but rather to people 
around relevant decision makers (usually their assistants).19 Such intermediaries worked both 
sides of the privatization contract by negotiating secret offers without direct contact between the 
concerned parties. Information about such corrupt deals has occasionally surfaced during in-
tense political conflicts within a governing party, but has appeared to be a by-product of politi-
cal rivalry rather than the pursuit of public integrity. 
                                                     
18 D. Kaufman, A. Kaliberda(1996)Integrating the Unofficial Economy into the Dynamics of Post-Socialist Econo-
mies: A Framework of Analysis and Evidence, in B. Kaminski(ed)Economic Transition in Russia and the New States 
of Euroasia, ME Sharpe, Amonk, NY. The same position is taken by the World Bank in its Report in Anti-Corruption 
in Transition, see: World Bank(2000)Anti-corruption in transition: A Contribution to the Policy Debate, The World 
Bank, Washington, p. 32. 
19 Some Polish parliamentary members have up to 20 paid and voluntary assistants who represent them while dealing 
with voters and other stakeholders. Some commentators believe that some parliamentary assistants serve mostly to 
organize unofficial payments – see: The job of parliamentary assistant (Pozycja na asystenta) in Polityka, nr 51/2004. 
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It is difficult to assess the extent of such high corruption, but it seems that this has been a well-
established pattern in large-scale privatizations with foreign participation in Poland. Recent 
criminal investigations and political scandals related to privatization with foreign participation 
include: the lobbying firm of Marek D.20, who offered his services in the privatization process of 
Częstochowa steelworks to two foreign bidders; these services consisted of, among other things, 
bribing a member of parliament (from 2001 until 2004) close to the Prime Minister by giving 
him a luxurious car worth 500.000 PLN (more than 100.000 EURO). 2001 saw the arrest of an 
assistant to the then-deputy minister of defense for the request of bribes that he apparently used 
(on his boss’s behalf) to woo the bidders in the privatization process. The dismissal of Deputy 
Prime Minister Janusz Tomaszewski21 under accusations of creating a bribe extracting group 
within the government made news in 1998.22 Today the frequency of such practices remains 
unknown. But it can be assumed that the practices of high corruption were even more open and 
went entirely unpunished in the early 1990s as decision makers defended their actions by blam-
ing the pioneering, and thus error-prone, character of the transformation process. 
It is somehow paradoxical that the Polish mass privatization scheme which was designed to 
exceed social expectations by giving away the shares of 512 medium sized enterprises has 
ended amidst corruption scandals. 
The Polish mass privatization program was approved by the parliament in 1995. 25.9 m persons 
(that is 95.9 percent of those entitled) bought the right to participate in the program by paying 
20 PLN for a participation certificate. The certificate could later be exchanged for shares in 15 
national investment funds which in turn owned the shares of a mix of 512 companies. By 1999 
approximately 25.2 m certificates were exchanged for shares (98.7 percent of the certificates 
issued). Most people sold them immediately and the shares were bought by financial intermedi-
aries leading to the concentration of ownership. 
It has been estimated that while the average Pole participating in the mass privatization earned 
hardly 70 PLN, the state treasury received revenues amounting to 917m PLN, paying a stagger-
ing approximate 860m PLN to investment funds as a management fee during the same time 
period. Contrary to the expectations of the program designers, who believed that national in-
vestment funds would restructure controlled enterprises, increase their value, sell them to other 
investors and generate profits for shareholders and the state treasury, national investment funds 
have excelled in „dirty dealings” typically consisting of selling assets to friends or other politi-
cally connected persons and purposefully incurring losses by moving profits to related compa-
nies. Counting just the best-known cases of fraud (and implicit corruption) in national invest-
ment funds, it can be said that at least 5 percent of companies were implicated in suspicious 
deals.23 Thus the errors in the construction of the mass privatization program made it easy prey 
for speculators and dirty dealers.  
Similarly, small-scale privatization, often managed locally, has gained a bad reputation among 
Poles, as apparently the bulk of such transactions has consisted of pre-arranged transactions, 
including collusion of bidders, undervaluation of assets and other special deals. It seems that 
such transactions were commonplace in the early 1990s, when they were given the innocuous 
name of „small privatization” organized by local authorities. In this way the local government 
                                                     
20 Marek Dochnal used to work with politicians for at least a decade. As the first lucrative public contract with his 
participation dates from 1991 – see: The Secret Mission of Dochnal (Tajna misja Dochnala) in Rzeczpospolita from 
18 October 2004. 
21 Janusz Tomaszewski was a deputy prime minister from the end of 1997 till September 1999 – see: The Game of 
Delays (Gra na zwłokę) in Rzeczpospolita from 2 September 1999. 
22 An anecdote says that even people at the EBRD when speaking to potential foreign participants in the Polish priva-
tization process used to advise to invite a Polish intermediary who can build trust with Polish decision makers and 
such an advice might have looked like an encouragement to corrupt. 
23 NFI w cieniu afer (NFIs in the shadow of affairs) in Rzeczpospolita, from 25–26 June 2004. 
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privatized commercial space, buildings and small enterprises. Investigations by the Supreme 
Control Chamber showed that small privatization was plagued by abuses of law and other ir-
regularities. 
Any criticism of the way the privatization process in Poland was managed is countered with 
untenable claims. Polish reformers defend the implementation with two typical arguments: 
firstly, that without privatization the Polish economy would look like the Byelorussian one 
(comparing it to the worst case scenario); secondly, that privatization is necessary to cut politi-
cians off from the influence of enterprises, thereby paving the way for improvements in effi-
ciency (denigrating politics).24  
Not surprisingly, only a few dare to raise objections to the privatization as implemented. Kazim-
ierz Z. Poznański, an analyst of Polish post-communist economic transformations, has been an 
outspoken critic of the overly rapid pace of ownership transformations by pointing out that it 
has created a climate favorable for corruption in the past.25 
The reasoning developed by Poznański can be summarized as follows: Although the reform of 
ownership structure and privatization in particular were proclaimed as indispensable for increas-
ing the efficiency of the Polish economy, in practice privatization has become an end in itself. 
Subsequent governments, ministers of privatization and regional governors controlling state-
owned companies have presented such indicators as the revenue earned from privatization, the 
number of privatized companies or the reduction in the share of state-owned companies as the 
most important measure of their performance in office. Such an attitude may have led to the 
selling out of enterprises in the pursuit of such goals regardless of any other consideration. 
3.2 Playing with Procedures of Public Procurement 
Public procurement has been another important arena in the fight against corruption. This is 
due, firstly, to the economic importance of the public procurement system; in 2004 the market 
of public procurement amounted to more than 70 bl PLN (at that time about 16 bl EURO),26 and 
secondly because the eventual irregularities in this system set a bad example for the deeply con-
cerned public. 
Despite efforts to create formally efficient anti-corruption checks in the Polish public procure-
ment system,27 Polish entrepreneurs believe that public procurement is plagued by corruption 
because of politicians’ and public officials’ insistence on bending the rules to benefit their pri-
vate interests. 
Available data show that the rules of public procurement are often violated or manipulated in 
order to generate benefits for selected bidders. Typical manipulations include: 
• setting the requirement in the public procurement of, for instance, computer equipment in 
such a way as to exclude certain vendors; 
• abusing the principles of trade secrets in order to restrict the circulation of information 
about the outcomes of the procurement; 
                                                     
24 These arguments are typically presented by Leszek Balcerowicz – one of authors of the Polish economic reforms in 
1990 – see for instance an interview with Balcerowicz – Los Balcerowicza (The fate of Balcerowicz), in Rzeczpo-
spolita from 5 November 2004. 
25 Poznański Kazimierz Z., The Morals of Transition: Decline of Public Interest and Runaway Reforms in Eastern 
Europe, [in:] Antoni Sorin and Vladimir Tismaneanu (ed.) Between Past and Future. The Revolutions of 1989 and 
their Aftermath, Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000. 
26 Billions are at stake, in Tygodnik Powszechny, from 15 August 2004. 
27 The Procurement Law in Poland has been modified several times in order to eliminate identified drawbacks. The 
latest modification from March 2004 has added among others a rule that large public procurements are resolved in the 
presence of a representative of the Central Procurement Office (CPO – Urząd Zamówień Publicznych) and that the 
CPO has the right to the ex ante control, that is the control of the procurement rules and not only its outcomes. 
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• violating the rules of transparent behaviour in all stages of public procurement proceedings; 
• allowing for leakages from the procurement commission which enable a preferred company 
to offer lower prices than those offered by competitors; 
• setting impossible deadlines for work performance which cannot realistically be met. A 
company privy to the false requirement presents its offer and goes unpunished for signifi-
cant delays in delivery.28  
It is interesting to note that the irregularities in public procurement seem to occur more often at 
the local and not at the national level. Although local public procurements are typically low-
value procurements, they dominate the public procurement system due to their sheer number. 
Large-scale national public procurements attract publicity and media coverage, which reduces 
the collusion incentive among the bidders and increases the likelihood that the loser would pro-
test if it perceived any irregularity in the procurement process. 
Small-scale local public procurements tend to happen more frequently, which might lead the 
participants in the procurement process to collude by dividing themselves into „today’s losers 
and tomorrow’s winners“ or to tolerate irregularities in the belief that they might be exploited in 
the next round of public procurement. 
Furthermore, post-communist local polities are more vulnerable to domination by closed politi-
cal-business networks. Entrepreneurs willing to participate in the local public procurement mar-
ket think that the likelihood of winning the next contract by entering such networks are higher 
than the likelihood of winning the contract by challenging the outcome of a corrupt procure-
ment. Thus, outside bidders are either co-opted by the network or they are doomed to be mar-
ginalized in the local procurement process. 
The Municipality of Warsaw served as an example of dirty political-business networks through-
out the 1990s. Large public investments, such as new bridges over the Vistula river, were for-
mally organized according to the public procurement law, but in reality the competition for con-
struction contracts was manipulated to give work and revenues to a small group of businessmen. 
These facts, although gossiped about earlier, came to the surface only after the 2002 municipal 
elections brought new political leaders, committed to cleaning up the government of Warsaw, to 
power.29 
The Municipality of Starachowice is another case in point. In Starachowice the local political 
elite was tightly linked by family or business ties with the local business elite and local govern-
ment spending was subordinated to business interests. In addition, local politicians were pro-
tected by some members of the government like Zbigniew Sobótka (once deputy minister of 
internal affairs), who warned them about pending police actions. Only large-scale political 
scandals and national media coverage, followed by the actions of public prosecutors, helped to 
disrupt the functioning of this corrupt local system.30 
Are such well-known cases of local corruption the exception or the rule? It is difficult to say 
with certainty, but it seems that the corruption of local governments has become endemic.31 
                                                     
28 These abuses have been identified by experts in the practice of public procurement in Poland and reported in 
Rzeczpospolita from 13 July 2004. 
29 The control of the Supreme Chamber of Control has revealed the scale of corruption and illegalities in the construc-
tion of the Świętokrzyski Bridge in Warsaw – see: Cheated bridge over Vistula River (Lewy most nad Wisłą) in 
Rzeczpospolita from 12 January 2005. 
30 See: Where is the Godfather of Jagiello (Gdzie jest ojciec chrzestny Jagiełły) in Rzeczpospolita from 11 July 2003. 
31 Polish media report about new types of corruption in local public services. One type are funeral services paid from 
social security funds in which entrepreneurs pay local authority for the right to run a funeral firm and next pay medi-
cal staff for an early information about the cases of death. Second type are geodetic services necessary to meet the 
local zoning requirement. In this case the maps are prepared by municipality geometricians who at the same run 
private geometrical firms.   
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The Polish government as well as public interest organizations like the Polish chapter of Trans-
parency International try to counter the threat of corruption in the local public procurement sys-
tem by encouraging entrepreneurs to report perceived irregularities and by proposing further 
changes in the public procurement law, which would allow so-called „social observers” to par-
ticipate in the proceedings of public procurement commissions.32 
Critics of the Polish public procurement system say that part of the registered irregularities can 
be interpreted as a logical reaction to the drawbacks of this system. They criticize it for its ap-
parent stringency (the public procurement process starts when the purchase value in a given 
public institution cumulatively exceeds 4,000 Euro) and for its inflexibility. They report exam-
ples of situations in which a purchase in face-to-face contract negotiations might result in a 
lower price than a price fixed through public proceeding. They also point out (like Jan Dworak 
– the president of Polish public television) that they have to open public procurement proceed-
ings when they negotiate a specific contract with a pre-selected agent who can assure the best 
performance (as in when public television hires a renowned artist for the production of a 
movie).33 
Such criticism reflects a widespread misunderstanding in Poland of the function of public pro-
curement rules. As is already well-known, the role of public procurement rules consists both in 
assuring on-average efficient pricing of public contracts and in maintaining trust in public insti-
tutions which spend public money. 
3.3 The Secret Service and the Polish Economic Transformation 
While discussing factors which fuel high level corruption in Poland, it is necessary to discuss 
the role of the secret service in Poland’s transformation. 
It is now more and more evident that the negotiated transition from communism, once acknowl-
edged as the optimal solution to the problem of exiting communism, has generated many nega-
tive effects. One such effect has been the privileged position of the nomenklatura and secret 
service, which has allowed them to take advantage of post-communist economic transforma-
tions. 
Secret information and secret networks have been instrumental in helping many agents to trans-
form the „capital of secret information” into economic benefits. Analyzing the mechanisms 
which facilitated the smooth conversion of communists into business leaders, Maria Los and 
Andrzej Zybertowicz pointed to “dirty togetherness” as group bonds which served to capture 
economic benefits from the system’s transformation.34 
The influence of the secret service started in the 1980s. Despite widespread belief in the re-
formed and softened nature of communist rule in Poland in this period, Poland was still a post-
totalitarian party/police state (the birth of Solidarity social movement in 1980 meant the weak-
ening of the legitimacy of the system, to which communists responded by expanding police 
vigilance). Historical sources revealed nowadays have shown that security services coordinated 
preparations for the negotiated transition (the „round table” talks with the moderate opposition 
started in early 1989, which opened the way for the system’s peaceful transformation) and that 
the commercialization of nomenklatura and security services had been an anticipatory strategy 
started in the mid-1980s to prepare an economic soft landing for them. Furthermore, it seems 
justified to say that round table talks created a climate of moral complicity between parts of the 
                                                     
32 This proposal has been put forward by Transparency International Poland in its programme „Pact for Honesty” – 
www.transparency.pl. 
33 See: More Limitations to Open Public Procurement (Więcej przetargów ograniczonych) in Rzeczpospolita from 22 
June 2004. 
34 Maria Los, Andrzej Zybertowicz(2000)Privatizing the Police-State. The case of Poland, New York: St.Martin’s 
Press. 
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anti-communist opposition and communist elites, and that this collusion was abetted by an ear-
lier penetration of the Solidarity movement by security agents. 
It seems paradoxical that the ex-communist nomenklatura was supported in its economic self-
serving by economic liberals. Zdzisław Krasnodębski has argued that Polish liberals engaged in 
public discourse which focused society’s attention exclusively on economic hardships and eco-
nomic gains.35 Such an amoral vision of the economy helped those in public offices use their 
powers not to implement any long-term vision of a common good, but to distribute fortunes to 
their friends and to themselves.  
How have ex-communists and security agents extended their influence in the aftermath of the 
post-totalitarian party/police state? Los and Zybertowicz emphasize the importance of the selec-
tive destruction of secret files which later helped to blackmail and manipulate people in public 
positions to the benefit of ex-communists/secret agents. In addition, secret service agents have 
been leading the development of private security agencies, which at present outnumber the 
forces of the state police, and which very often serve as a facade for dirty business dealings. 
By now it has been well documented that ex-secret agents have been involved in large financial 
scandals such as FOZZ (the theft of public funds devoted to repay parts of Poland’s foreign 
debts) or in the creation of several banks (like BIG Bank) in the early 1990s.36 The hypothesis 
about the existence of dirty ties is strengthened by the fact that no major financial scandal (and 
implicit corruption) has been successfully investigated by public prosecutors in Poland who are 
subordinate to the Ministry of Justice. 
Diagram 1: Areas of activities and mechanisms of influence of former secret police agents on 
the transformation of the Polish economy 
areas of 
activities
mechanisms
large scale foreign investments; 
informatics and telecommunication; 
privatization; 
banking and finance; 
defence contracts and arms trade; 
fuel and energy sector; 
private security services 
networks based on “dirty past” 
use of secret police files; 
access to easy finance; 
access to foreign markets; 
business counselling; 
lobbying 
 
Source: Elaborated internal materials of the Polish Ministry of Defense and the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs 
from 1999–2001 – after Maria Jarosz(2004)Power, Privileges, Corruption, PWN Warsaw, p. 45. 
It would probably be inappropriate to exaggerate the influence of secret agents behind the 
choice of grand economic and political strategy (exemplified by the dilemma of whether to lib-
eralize the economy or join the World Trade Organization). But it is becoming more and more 
                                                     
35 Zdzisław Krasnodębski(2004)Demokracja peryferium (Democracy at the Periphery), Warszawa. 
36 See: The History of Privatisation of PZU (Historia prywatyzacji PZU) in Rzeczpospolita from 3 January 2005. 
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evident that „dirty” influences have been instrumental in arranging deals which benefit individ-
ual members of the ex-nomenklatura (thus, already in the late 1980s the decision to liberalize 
foreign exchange transactions had been „surprisingly” anticipated by an apparent secret police 
collaborator – later turned politician and senator, who opened several foreign exchange counters 
during the same day in which this decision was made public). 
It might be true that the influence of secret agents on Polish economic transformations helped to 
exploit short-term opportunities for economic growth by rapidly reorganizing the economy, but 
at the same time, this influence might have damaged the country’s long-term economic growth 
potential by institutionalizing corruption. 
3.4 Political Elites’ Attitudes towards the State 
It was pointed out earlier that the metamorphosis of the state’s role is the key problem of post-
communist transformations. Nonetheless, politicians should have maintained a high ethical 
standard of public service when scaling down and restructuring state activities. This, however, 
was not the case in Poland. The distrust of the state, the approval of illegality and the low en-
forcement capacity of the public administration have been reinforced by the behaviour of con-
temporary governing elites. The following examples will illustrate this thesis. 
It has not been rare in Poland to see government members being involved in private activities 
directed against the state. Thus, Witold Modzelewski, a deputy minister of finance and a chief 
architect of tax laws, has been known for counselling private businesses on how to exploit the 
ambiguities of the law to avoid paying taxes. Henryk Goryszewski, once a deputy prime minis-
ter, lost his position as head of the parliamentary budget commission when it came out that his 
law firm advised firms on how to evade taxation.37  
Furthermore many Polish high-level government officials took jobs in companies with whom 
they used to consort while holding governmental posts shortly after being dismissed or stepping 
down. 
In general it has been observed that Polish political parties approach politics as the easiest and 
fastest way to personal wealth. In a famous saying Jarosław Kaczyński (a member of the par-
liament from 1997–2001 in the post-Solidarity coalition) revealed that his fellow MPs are 
guided by the rule: „Now is our turn” (Teraz, k… my) referring to the right to exploit their po-
litical positions for material benefit. 
Contemporary political economy states that one should look at politics without romanticism, 
suggesting that any analysis should start with the assumption that politicians are guided by their 
private interests. In a mature democratic system the tendency to exploit public positions for 
private gain is tempered by the desire to be re-elected, by laws about admissible and inadmissi-
ble behaviour and by ethical codes. These three restraints do not function well in Poland. 
First, paradoxically we observe that many parliamentary members are not interested in reelec-
tion. Thus, they fervently act to extract as many private gains as possible during the only term 
they are in the parliament. 
Second, the laws which clearly distinguish between legal and illegal behaviour are often intro-
duced only after the discovery of loopholes. Thus, those who exploit these gaps go unpunished 
and their „alegal“ private gains remain theirs. 
Third, the notion of „conflict of interest“ is gaining public understanding only after 15 years of 
transformation. Thus, this very important principle in distinguishing ethical behaviour from 
                                                     
37 „Polska norma” in Polityka, 30/2000 and Recommended with doubt (Rekomendowani mimo wątpliwości) in 
Rzeczpospolita from 21 September 2001. 
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unethical behaviour is starting to guide the public’s evaluation of the politicians’ behaviour. But 
the gains from unethical behaviour stay with their reapers. 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper I have tried to show that the policies to transform state assets, state policies and 
state functions have been at the core of the corruption problem in contemporary Poland. The 
scale of this problem has been intensified by exceptionally high, one-shot gains which can be 
extracted by people in public positions. Intense political battles to create and distribute such 
gains have led to chaotic, short-term oriented policies which in turn have generated new oppor-
tunities for corrupt behaviour. 
It remains to be seen whether endemic corruption is a temporary phenomenon or a stable equi-
librium in Poland. It remains to be seen how and when it will change with domestic political 
developments and EU membership.  
 
 
Kaja Gadowska 
Clientelism in the Silesian coal mining industry1 
1. Introduction. The Idea of Clientelism  
Clientelism manifests itself in different levels in all types of societies. It occurs when individu-
als or groups of unequal status converge while occupying differing positions in the social hier-
archy (a “perpendicular dyad”). When official formalized methods of realizing specified inter-
ests or paths of access to desired resources are recognized as inadequate, then informal paths are 
activated. The individual occupying the higher position in a social hierarchy, i.e. the patron, is 
capable of offering assistance and protection to people or groups situated lower in the social 
hierarchy, i.e. clients. The patron extends a protective umbrella over them in exchange for speci-
fied services. The basis of clientelistic linkages is constituted by feelings of personal loyalty and 
obligation, which are associated with an exchange of resources of unequal character.2  
The increase of frequency of clientelism is fostered by specific conditions, such as feelings of 
uncertainty, which are associated with transformation. People seeking a method to reduce uncer-
tainty refer to different types of informal arrangements. A specific social acquiescence to extra-
formal activities has its roots in familiar practices from the communist period such as „arrang-
ing for oneself“ various deals, which range from inducing a sales-person to put aside a kilogram 
of meat purchased by ration cards (during the communist era) to influencing the allotment of a 
cooperative apartment before the normal waiting sequence.3  
Certain areas of social life appear to be particularly susceptible to the formation of linkages of a 
clientelistic character. The political and politicized economic spheres are the most subject to 
clientelism, especially the state, which through its representatives has the power to intervene 
directly. The intensification of the phenomenon is favored by the fact that, during periods of 
transformation, politics of necessity dictate the economy precisely because decisions pertaining 
to the economy take place in the political forum. After systemic change in 1989, a new driving 
force inclined patrons to extend protection over specific groups of client interests, in accordance 
with the mass clientelism theory by Eisenstadt and Lemarchand: soliciting support in parliamen-
tary elections.4 Unfortunately, during periods of transformation, this type of motivation could 
have extremely negative consequences. The inclination to appease voters can lead to the promo-
tion of special interests and, consequently, to the delay of uncomfortable reforms.  
Patrons can also aspire to maintain control over resources and to retain the status quo by con-
serving the type of structure which makes it possible for them to advance their personal inter-
ests, strengthen their power, ensure privileges and to subordinate dependency from those in 
                                                     
1 This article is based on my book ZJAWISKO KLIENTELIZMU POLITYCZNO-EKONOMICZNEGO. SYSTE-
MOWA ANALIZA POWIĄZAŃ SIECIOWYCH NA PRZYKŁADZIE PRZEKSZTAŁCEŃ SEKTORA GÓRNIC-
ZEGO W POLSCE, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2002. 
2 Zuckerman A. ”Clientelist Politics in Italy” and Gellner E. ”Patrons and Clients” in: Gellner E., Waterbury J. (eds) 
PATRONS AND CLIENTS IN MEDITERRANEAN SOCIETIES, Duckworth 1977; Eisenstadt S. N., Lemarchand 
R. POLITICAL CLIENTELISM, PATRONAGE AND DEVELOPMENT, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, London 
1981, pp. 6–31. 
3 Tarkowski J. „Poland: Patrons and Clients in a Planned Economy“ in: Eisenstadt S. N., Lemarchand R. (eds) PO-
LITICAL CLIENTELISM, PATRONAGE AND DEVELOPMENT, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, London 1981; 
Tarkowski J. PATRONI I KLIENCI, Socjologia Świata Polityki Tom 2., ISP PAN, Warszawa 1994. 
4 Eisenstadt S. N., Lemarchand R. „The Study of Patron-Client Relations and Recent Developments in Sociological 
Theory” in: Eisenstadt S. N., Lemarchand R. POLITICAL CLIENTELISM, PATRONAGE AND DEVELOPMENT, 
Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, London 1981. 
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inferior positions.5 In the interim, economic logic is ignored and there is no discussion about 
working for the public good. This type of phenomenon, widely dispersed on the Polish political 
and economic scene, is termed cronyism, which refers to the network of linkages among allies, 
or cronies, who occupy prominent positions and mutually assist each other depending on the 
power possessed within a given moment.6 A serious problem is constituted in the fact that „in 
the political culture of the republic norms have developed which undermine the new state.“7  
During this period of transition, patron-client relations in Poland are one of the most important 
elements in arriving at political and economic solutions. Similarly, they exert a real influence on 
the tempo and direction of socio-economic changes. The organizationally concentrated coal 
mining industry is a branch which is, to a high degree, impervious to market reforms. This sec-
tor, which employs a considerable number of workers and consumes significant resources from 
the state budget, exerts a real impact on the entirety of systemic changes in Poland. However, it 
is necessary to note that while clientelism is not limited to the coal-mining industry, what is 
happening in the sector illustrates significantly wider and disturbing trends penetrating the Pol-
ish world of politics and economy.  
2. The Coal Mining Situation  
The restructuring of the coal mining industry constituted and continues to comprise one of the 
most fundamental socio-economic problems in the country. In the years 1990–2001, from the 
beginning moments of the process of transformation, the coal mining industry received financial 
assistance from budgetary resources surpassing 15,025 billion PLN (from a nominal perspective 
34,042 billion PLN in 2001 prices, at that time about 8,3 billion EURO). The combined costs of 
restructuring the sector in 1990–2001 amounted to 19,5 billion PLN (40 billion in 2001 prices, 
about 9,7 billion EURO).8 The planned cost of restructuring mining in the years 2003–2006 is 
estimated at 6,169 billion PLN (at that time about 1,4 billion EURO), of which 4,981 billion 
PLN (at that time about 1,1 billion EURO) will be designated to restructure employment 
(whereas 1,146 billion PLN, at that time about 0,26 billion EURO, will be allotted for restruc-
turing production capabilities, including the liquidation of mines). Assistance of this magnitude 
has not been received by any other sector in the Polish economy.9 Nonetheless, the results real-
ized thus far in restructuring programs remain disappointing.  
In the year 2001, the sum of mining debts, which include unpaid taxes, arrears to ZUS (Social 
Insurance Institution), as well as debts to suppliers of commodities and services, soared to 
21,5 billion PLN (at that time about 5,2 billion EURO), a sum equal to half of the national 
budget deficit). Subsequent government initiatives to restructure the sector are pushing the dates 
to achieve profitability for the branch continuously further into the future. The implementation 
of the governmental restructuring program for the years 2003–2006 resulted in 18 billion PLN’s 
                                                     
5 Gilsenan M. „Against Patron-Client Relations” in: Gellner E., Waterbury J. (eds) PATRONS AND CLIENTS IN 
MEDITERRANEAN SOCIETIES, Duckworth, London 1977. 
6 Waterbury J. „An Attempt to Put Patrons And Clients In their Place” in: Gellner E., Waterbury J. (eds) PATRONS 
AND CLIENTS IN MEDITERRANEAN SOCIETIES, Duckworth, London 1977. 
7 Kamiński A. „Patologia procesu prywatyzacji. Kapitalizm polityczny. Korupcja” in: Jarosz M. (red.) MANOWCE 
POLSKIEJ PRYWATYZACJI, PWN i ISP PAN, Warszawa 2001. 
8 Data from: NIK (Supreme Chamber of Control) report „Informacja o wynikach kontroli restrukturyzacji finansowej 
i organizacyjnej górnictwa węgla kamiennego w latach 1990–2001” 178/2002/P01/146/LKA. On the process of 
Polish coal mining sector restructuring see also: Karbownik A., Turek M. „Zmiany w Zarządzaniu w Górnictwie 
Węgla Kamiennego w Polsce”; Karbownik A. ”Kierunki Procesu Dostosowawczego Polskiego Górnictwa Węgla 
Kamiennego” in: PRZYSZŁOŚĆ WĘGLA KAMIENNEGO W EUROPIE ŚRODKOWOWSCHODNIEJ, Konfer-
encja programu SYNERGY, Katowice 1998; Karbownik A. ”Reforma Górnictwa Węgla Kamiennego – Do-
tychczasowe i Przewidywane efekty”, Materiały Konferencyjne Szkoły Eksploatacji Podziemnej, PAN, Kraków 
2000. 
9 To compare, the state budget allocates approximately 2,7 billion PLN for education. 
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(about 4 billion EURO) worth of debt relief for mining companies.10 In spite of this, at the end 
of 2004 the sector’s debts exceeded 7 billion PLN (at that time about 1,5 billion EURO). It is 
worth noting, however, that due to last year’s boom in the world coal market and the doubling 
of coal prices, the Polish hard coal sector yielded a profit of 2 billion PLN for the first time 
within the last 15 years. This in turn has led to strengthening resistance and protests against 
further reforms. Government plans to privatize Katowicki Coal Holding and subsequently 
Jastrzębska Coal Company have met with sharp opposition.  
3. Arguments  
The point of departure for this analysis was determined by questions pertaining to sources of 
durability and the mining sector’s relative imperviousness to change. I am arguing that one of 
the fundamental mechanisms serving the survival of the system is the presence of highly devel-
oped clientelistic networks and mutual dependencies between individual policy makers, i.e. key 
actors of the mining sector as well as its economic and political environment. The postponement 
of reforms serves to maintain opaqueness and facilitate the flow of public funds into private 
pockets.  
The delaying of the restructuring process is simultaneously the result of classical mass clientel-
ism, which is based on the bidding power of large groups, in this case miners, in relation to ac-
tual and potential political patrons. To the miners, restructuring means the liquidation of work-
places. Therefore, we can speak of a specific convergence of interests for both parties: the man-
aging and supervisory personnel as well as the miners remain caught in the failure of reforms 
and maintaining the status quo.  
4. Research Methods  
Many quantitative and qualitative research tools were applied in the research and elaboration of 
results. The political-economic phenomenon of clientelism was subject to analysis from the 
inter-systemic perspective, and therefore from the individual level of actors and the micro-
politics practiced by them. A database was constructed, illustrating the composition of person-
nel in supervisory and managerial organs concerned with the organizational objects of the coal 
mining industry and its administrative, economic and social environment (SPSS). A network 
analysis was applied to model flows between positions in the mining sector (Clementine). Forty 
in-depth interviews were conducted with key actors in the mining sector and its political-
economic environment. Reports were analyzed from the results of over 20 inspections by NIK 
(Supreme Chamber of Control) in the coal mining sector. Similarly, an analysis of the legal 
basis for restructuring the coal mining sector (over 30 statutes) and an analysis of 7 governmen-
tal restructuring programs for the coal mining industry with modifications were executed. Like-
wise, content analysis of articles in weeklies such as the Kurier Związkowy and Trybuna 
Górnicza was carried out. Research methods are presented in Illustration 1 on the next page.  
                                                     
10 Among others debts from taxes from the state budget, dues for ZUS (Social Insurance Institution) in part financed 
by the payer, dues towards NFOŚiGW (The National Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Management). 
Act of 11.28.2003 on „The Restructuring of the Coal Mining Industry in the Years 2003–2006” (DZ.U.03.210.2037). 
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Illustration 1: Research Methods  
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5. The Organizational Structure of the Coal Mining Industry  
The phenomenon of clientelism in coal mining is fostered by a specific organizational structure 
in the sector, which was formed in 1993, after a short-term three year period of independence 
for the mines. Thereafter a process of commercialization was undertaken in the industry and 7 
coal companies were created in the form of joint stock companies with the sole participation of 
the State Treasury. At that time the following Coal Companies were created: Bytomska Spółka 
Węglowa S.A., Gliwicka Spółka Węglowa S.A., Jastrzębska Spółka Węglowa S.A., Nadwiślań-
ska Spółka Węglowa S.A., Rudzka Spółka Węglowa S.A., Rybnicka Spółka Węglowa S.A. and 
Katowicki Holding Węglowy S.A. In the same year the domestic coal trader „Węglozbyt“ and 
the coal exporter „Węglokoks“ were transformed into joint stock companies with the singular 
participation of the State Treasury. In the year 2000 a State Treasury property was formed called 
Spółka Restrukturyzacji Kopalń S.A. (Coal Mining Restructuring Company). In 2003 Kom-
pania Węglowa S.A. was established, under whose authority the collieries from five coal com-
panies were transferred.  
The regulatory bodies for the mining industry are WUG (State Mining Authority) along with 
OUG (District Mining Offices). Academic reserves for the sector are comprised of GIG (Central 
Mining Institute) and Mining Faculties at AGH University of Science and Technology and Sile-
sian University of Technology. According to the act „The Adjustment of the Coal Mining In-
dustry to Functioning in the Conditions of a Market Economy and Specific Powers and Tasks of 
Mining Communes“ of 11.26.1998 (DZ.U.98.162.1112), the ownership rights to coal mining 
and coal trading companies belong to the Ministry of Economy (on behalf of the State Treas-
ury). Control over the process of restructuring was entrusted to PARG S.A. (State Coal Mining 
Restructuring Agency), and subsequently ARP S.A. (Industrial Development Agency). In each 
mine, there are over a dozen workers’ unions. Around the mining industry, there is a series of 
private businesses offering various services to the mines and coal companies. A schematic of 
the actual organizational structure of the coal mining industry is presented in Illustration 2.  
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Illustration 2: The Organizational Structure of the Coal Mining Industry  
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6. Mass Clientelism. The Situation of the Miners  
Even though there has been a significant reduction in the amount of workers employed under-
ground, miners continue to comprise a professional group which is large enough to make the 
government and other political powers listen to them. In 1990 the average employment figure in 
the coal mining industry was approximately 387,800 people, whereas in 2004 the number 
dropped to 136,500 people, which reduced the total by practically 250,000 people.11 The trend 
of restructuring employment in the mining industry is presented in Illustration 3.  
Illustration 3: The Process of Employment Restructuring  
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The greatest intensity of departures from coal mining can be observed in the year 1998, which is 
associated with the implementation of a governmental program to reform the sector and the 
introduction of the 11.26.1998 statute „The Adjustment of the Coal Mining Industry to Func-
tioning in the Conditions of a Market Economy and Specific Powers and Tasks of Mining 
Communes” (DZ.U.98.162.1112). The act introduced a series of indispensable tools for achiev-
                                                     
11 Data from NIK (Supreme Chamber of Control) report: „Informacja o wynikach kontroli restrukturyzacji finan-
sowej i organizacyjnej górnictwa węgla kamiennego w latach 1990–2001” 178/2002/P01/146/LKA . On the em-
ployment restructuring process in Polish coal mining industry see: Karbownik A., Jędrychowski S., Sobula W., Tausz 
K., Wodarski K. ”Analiza Problemów Społecznych w Procesie Restrukturyzacji Górnictwa Węgla Kamiennego” in: 
PRZYSZŁOŚĆ WĘGLA KAMIENNEGO W EUROPIE ŚRODKOWOWSCHODNIEJ, Konferencja programu 
SYNERGY, Katowice 1998; Karbownik A., Jędrychowski S., Sobula W., Tausz K., Wodarski K. ANALIZA I 
OCENA PRZEBIEGU PROCESU RESTRUKTURYZACJI ZATRUDNIENIA W POLSKIM GÓRNICTWIE WĘ-
GLA KAMIENNEGO W LATACH 1990–1997,GIG, Katowice 1998; Karbownik A., Jędrychowski S., Sobula W., 
Tausz K., Wodarski K. RESTRUKTURYZACJA ZATRUDNIENIA W POLSKIM GÓRNICTWIE WEGLA KA-
MIENNEGO W LATACH 1998–1999, GIG, Katowice 2000; Szczepański M.S. OPEL Z GÓRNICZYM PIURO-
PUSZEM. RESTRUKTURYZACJA WOJEWÓDZTWA KATOWICKIEGO 1989–1996, GIG, Katowice 1997; 
Szczepański M.S. ”Górnicy Górnośląscy – Ludzie Zbędni, Ludzie Luźni? Osobowościowe Uwarunkowania Restruk-
turyzacji Górnictwa Węglowego.” in: Szczepański M.S. (red.) GÓRNICY GÓRNOŚLĄSCY – LUDZIE ZBĘDNI, 
LUDZIE LUŹNI?, AMP, Kraków-Katowice 1994; Szczepański M.S. ”Kruszenie Węgla i Wydobywanie Górników – 
Społeczno-Kulturowe Uwarunkowania Restrukturyzacji Górnictwa Węgla Kamiennego” in: REFORMA POL-
SKIEGO GÓRNICTWA WĘGLA KAMIENNEGO – MONITOROWANIE REALIZACJI, Materiały Konferency-
jne, Katowice, Politechnika Śląska 1999. 
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ing profitability from mining companies. One of these instruments, „The Mining Social Packet“, 
which encouraged miners to leave the mines, was extremely successful.  
Aside from mining vacations, which assured the worker payments in the amount of 75% of the 
average monthly salary as well as social relief in the amount of 65% of the average monthly 
salary, the act introduced extraordinarily popular severance packages. The amount of one-time 
unconditional payoffs for miners leaving work amounted to 24 times the amount of the average 
monthly salary in mines and reached 50,000 PLN (at that time about 12,853 EURO). 
In fact, one of the indisputable successes of the mining reforms is the significant reduction of 
employment in the sector. In the years 1998–1999, immediately after the introduction of the 
Packet, 70,000 workers left the mines. Nevertheless, in subsequent years the exodus from the 
mines slackened due to shrinking employment alternatives outside of the industry.  
As in 1999, one of the respondents explained himself:  
Well, we’re taking advantage of this package because it’s evident that no one knows how 
long it will last. People are in a hurry –- who knows when they’ll change something or 
take it away? There is no reason to be surprised on one hand. But everything is going in 
the wrong direction; they’re destroying mining and the whole country will soon regret it. 
(…) To have a grown man sit at home! There’s money in the beginning and then what? 
Will his wife respect him, his kids respect him? 
One of the union activists commented: 
From the point of view of the union members, we’re the ones who have mixed feelings, 
because with each program they are lessening employment. Conditions, well, they were 
worked out positively. On the one hand, those who stayed, well, they have a greater feel-
ing of security, that there won’t be group layoffs but only voluntary ones. Payoffs are 
perceived positively, financial conditions, though nowadays, there is less interest. But on 
the other hand, it’s real wages which have dropped for us. 
Another respondent commented: 
From the time that the reform came in (1998) over 90,000 people lost their livelihood and 
just in mining. And probably a similar amount of workplaces – if not more – were lost in 
the so-called mining environment. This is all very interdependent. (…) And what did we 
get in return? Several thousand workplaces in a Special Economic Zone. Around 2,500 
people work for „Opel“. Well, let it be in sum several thousand. A drop in the ocean. (…) 
People have started to understand that the Mining Social Package is a solution for the 
short-term. They have simply started to understand the consequences. (…) Finding work 
beyond mining, today, is a fantasy. This is starting to be visible with the naked eye, young 
people without work – it’s pathological, whatever you call it. Because these are in large 
part young people, this is a social problem. For our family, this type of traditional Sile-
sian family, well this type of situation is a threat. 
In 1997 unemployment in Silesia reached 6.4%, in the year 2000 it surpassed 13% and in the 
year 2003 it climbed to 16.5%. Still, in some mining towns, the level of unemployment is sig-
nificantly higher. In Żory it reaches 24.3% and in Bytom 25.5%.12  
A statute dated 11.28.2003, „The Restructuring of the Coal Mining Industry in the Years 2003–
2006“ (DZ.U.03.210.2037), introduces a shelter-mobilization package. The program is built 
with elements of regional politics.13 Miners employed underground are able to take advantage of 
                                                     
12 Data from the internet informational resource of the Ministry of Economy http://www.mgpips.gov.pl as well as 
GUS (Central Statistical Office) http://www.stat.gov.pl and the portal http://www.bezrobocie.pl.  
13 For the realization of a ”Program of Softening the Effects of Restructuring Employment in Coal Mining of the 
Silesian Region” resources are to be allocated from a loan from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment in the amount of 25 million EURO. 
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mining vacations, assured 75% of their monthly wage to the time of retirement benefit acquisi-
tion. However, to the workers on the surface, the focus is on stipends and skill re-qualification 
for a period not longer than 6 months in the amount of 100% of their monthly salary with con-
tracts for re-qualification as well as loans of up to 20,000 PLN for the undertaking of small 
business activities. The act also foresees assistance to employers who create workplaces for 
those who are leaving mining, which includes the refinancing of the costs of the workers’ sala-
ries. A comparison of instruments of politics for restructuring employment, which were in-
cluded in the statutes of 1998 and 2003, are presented in Illustration 4.  
Illustration 4: Legal Solutions Directed Towards Workers in the Coal Mining Sector 
THE MINING SOCIAL PACKET 
Act of 11.26.1998 on the Adjustment of the Coal Mining Industry to Functioning 
in the Conditions of a Market Economy 
• mining vacation – 75% of average monthly salary 
• social relief – 65% of average monthly salary 
• one-time monetary send-offs 
• 1998 – 14.4 times the amount of average monthly salary 
• 2002 – 7.2 times the amount of average monthly salary 
• one-time unconditional monetary send-offs 
• 1998 – 24 times the amount of average monthly salary 
• 2002 – 12 times the amount of average monthly salary 
SHELTER-MOBILIZATION PACKET 
Act of 11.28.2003 on the Restructuring of the Coal Mining Industry  
in the Years 2003–2006 
Underground employees 
• mining vacation – 75% of the monthly salary to the time of acquiring retirement benefits 
Surface employees 
• stipend on skill re-qualification (for a period no longer than 6 months) in the amount of 
100% of the monthly salary 
• contracts for re-qualification 
• loans for re-qualification (up to 20.000 PLN) 
• loans for undertaking of small business activity 
• assistance to employers creating work places for those that are leaving mining 
• refinancing of costs of workers salary 
• reimbursement of costs of fixed assets for creating new workplaces 
 
Despite a significant reduction in employment, as an interest group, miners continue to possess 
significant negotiating power. Practically 136,500 persons are still employed in mining, and, 
along with their families and workers of general mining firms, comprise a substantial voting 
block. Miners as a clientele and their potential political patrons continue to have much to offer 
each other. In miners’ circles there is a persistent belief in their own power. In 1998 it was ex-
pressed that: 
If anything happens, then 200,000 men will take to the streets. If it starts burning us so 
much that we’ve had enough, then we’re going to make for Warsaw and they’ll see who 
will win. 
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An activist of one of the more radical work occupational unions exclaimed: 
There’s less of us but we’ll show them that we know how to fight over what’s ours. No 
‘Solidarity’ guys are going to cheat us. Union members! They’re pretending to be union 
members but its all politics. (…) They made a deal! To close the mines because people 
have to leave the mining industry. Well, we’ll see who’s going to have to leave. 
The next respondent was more drastic in his words: “They’re going to bring us to a showdown 
and blood will spill. We’re not going to let them walk all over us. They’re not going to humili-
ate us.” 
The other side is well aware of the potential dangers posed by an open conflict with the miners. 
I was a witness to a demonstration by the miners next to the then Ministry of Industry and 
Trade, in the summer of 1992, in July, if I remember well. I’ll say it directly, it was dan-
gerous. 
One of the politicians recalled: 
Several years ago, I don’t remember in which year exactly, I observed a mining demon-
stration next to the Council of Ministers from the window. Honestly, we had our hearts in 
our mouths. Anything could have happened. 
Another interviewee argued that: 
The specific nature of mining is as such that you only de facto need several people to 
make the whole mine stop functioning. These are great losses for the state. A few coal 
mines will stop and losses increase in an unimaginable manner. (…) We cannot allow 
this. Financially, the country cannot afford it, to do it by strength. Besides, mining is 
about 160,000 people. Politically, it cannot be allowed for some kind of …. It is obvious 
that the political risk and the price of such a conflict could be very high. That’s why more 
moderate paths must be chosen to achieve the established goal. 
Another politician said: 
I am speaking with the full belief that it is necessary to do everything to prevent a situa-
tion where a crowd of 100,000 people – well, maybe I’m exaggerating; this many won’t 
show up – but let it be even several thousand. A situation cannot be allowed which is 
made up of emotionally charged men armed with sticks, pick axes and stones or whatever 
will come with them to Warsaw. This type of situation is extremely dangerous. I don’t 
even want to refer to drastic examples from Romania. I was a witness to this type of dem-
onstration in Katowice and please believe me that even today my skin crawls at the idea 
of how this could have ended. All you need is an impulse and there is no control. 
The politicians’ fears were confirmed during a mining demonstration in Warsaw in September 
2003, when fighting between miners and police erupted and resulted in damages. The miners 
were sharply opposed to the restructuring plans contained in the governmental program for re-
forming the sector, with particular focus on the liquidation of 4 mines. In November a strike 
was undertaken in the mines. The power of the mining reserves did not go unnoticed and had its 
influence on the form of the restructuring act. Representatives of different political persuasions, 
including the SLD, expressed solidarity with the miners. The argument was raised that the liq-
uidation of the mines would mean political suicide for the SLD party in Silesia. As a conse-
quence, a series of modifications to the act were introduced and a provision was made allowing 
for the merger of mines.  
When analyzing the course of argumentation as to the form of the mining restructuring program, 
it is necessary to pay closer attention to the activities of mining professional unions. In Kom-
pania Węglowa alone, there are 28 active miners’ unions, bringing the sum of labor organiza-
tions to 204 (for an average of 9 per mine). An indicator of union membership in the Kompania 
collieries is approximately at the level of 86.6%. In some coal mines, however, membership 
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surpasses 100% as a result of some miners belonging to several unions. In the act dated 
05.23.1991, „Labor Unions“ (Dz. U.91.55.234 with later changes), the right to discharge union 
activists from their work duties for the duration of a term of office in the administrative body of 
the union organization is recognized along with the right to remuneration. Compensation is cal-
culated as follows: one worker in a monthly assessment of work equal to the number of mem-
bers employed by the workplace, when the number is less than 150; one worker, when the union 
numbers from 150 to 500 employed members in the workplace; two workers, when the union 
numbers from 501 to 1000 members employed by the workplace; three workers, when the union 
is comprised of 1001 to 2000 members employed in the workplace, and a subsequent worker is 
available with each additional 1000 employees, when the workplace’s union organization num-
bers over 2000 people hired in the workplace, then hours can be dispensed in a part-time man-
ner to a greater number of workers, in accordance with the regulations above.  
The annual costs of maintaining 189 full-time union activists in a company reach 16,5 million 
PLN. In 2003 the average monthly gross pay of a union activist was 4,928 PLN (at that time 
about 1,132 EURO), while the average monthly gross pay of a worker was 3,777 PLN (at that 
time about 868 EURO).14 Seeing that the activists are discharged from work duties under 
ground, their resistance against closing unprofitable mines, followed by the liquidation of union 
positions, is understandable.  
7. Individual Clientelism and Cronyism 
The Financial Situation of Personnel Managing  
and Supervising the Mining Sector  
One accepted research hypothesis states that the reason for the tightening of network clientelis-
tic links among key actors in the sector and its political and economic environment is deter-
mined by their access to relatively large amounts of money. Here we are concerned with a legal 
source of income as well as the opportunity for the unofficial flow of public money into private 
pockets.  
7.1 Primary Income in Mining 
Management Boards and Supervisory Councils  
In accordance with the act passed on 11.26.1998, „The Adjustment of the Coal Mining Industry 
to Functioning in the Conditions of a Market Economy and Specific Powers and Tasks of Min-
ing Communes“ (DZ.U.98.162.1112), in each of the coal companies (being sole-proprietorship 
companies of the State Treasury) there functions a 5 person management board. At the core of 
the statute dated 03.03.2000, entitled „The Salaries of Persons Managing Certain Legal Sub-
jects“ (Dz.U.00.26.306) (popularly called the “act on salary caps”), the official salary of mem-
bers of management cannot exceed 6 times the average monthly salary in the enterprise’s sector 
which is currently around 14,500 PLN (at that time about 3615 EURO).15 Until the appearance 
of this law, presidents and vice-presidents of management bodies had the opportunity to take 
salaries in sums two times higher. In comparison to the earnings of managers of large private 
companies, these are not particularly high amounts however, there remains the question of tying 
the amount of salary with the financial performance of the coal mining companies.16  
                                                     
14 Data from: the internet information service of Kompania Węglowa S.A. http://www.kwsa.pl.  
15 The average monthly salary in the industry sector in the 2004 amounted to 2,438 thousand PLN gross pay. 
16 For example, 30 thousand PLN is earned by the president of a construction firm from the Świetokrzyski Region, 
27.000 PLN for a management board member of one of the country’s medium sized IT firms listed on the stock 
exchange, 49.000 PLN for an management board member of one of the country’s large pharmaceutical firms. Data 
from: Rzeczpospolita 11.05.2003. 
 Clientelism in the Silesian Coal Mining Industry 31 
None of the management board members who were interviewed expressed the desire to leave 
their posts despite the significant lessening of their income occasioned by the passing of the 
salary law. There was instead a reference to a feeling of moral responsibility: 
Well, of course I won’t resign from my position. I’ve taken on a responsibility and I want 
to complete it as well as I can. I can’t simply throw the toys and get mad, even though I’d 
have a good reason; you don’t change the rules in the middle of the game. I was raised 
with a feeling of obligation and responsibility. 
Meanwhile, individuals beyond the boards of directors drew attention to the fact that even 
though there was a significant curtailment, the salaries of the management members continue to 
remain relatively high, and, as a result, the possibility of finding equally well-paying jobs is 
slim. 
Where will he make 12,000? Where? How many setbacks would he have to face? Here 
you have a steady income and peace and quiet. They’re not going to overwork themselves 
especially. What kind of politics do we have today? Stepping away from decisions, wait-
ing passively and only doing those things that they’re told. What’s he going to find bet-
ter? 
The opinion has been expressed that the reduction of official wages will be quickly compen-
sated for by an increase from inofficial income sources. 
A person lives at a certain level, right? He has certain obligations. And suddenly he’s 
been left with half of his money. At the same time he’s got some opportunities to get some 
money back in his pockets. (…) And do you think that he won’t take advantage of these 
opportunities? He has a feeling of loss, that he was cheated. He’s doing exactly the same 
(amount of work) but is getting half as much. You would have to be Saint Francis of As-
sisi. Anyhow, even under these salaries (now in force) only a few stop at this. Maybe 
I wrongly expressed myself – not everybody stops at this. 
The act of 03.03.2000, „The Salaries of Persons Managing Certain Legal Subjects“ 
(Dz.U.00.26.306), introduced further regulations to limit the universal practice in the branch of 
sitting on supervisory councils of multiple economic entities. In the essence of the statute, an 
individual can be a member of the supervisory council in only one company belonging to the 
State Treasury or in which the number of shares of the State Treasury surpasses 50%. The law 
also introduced salary limits for members of supervisory councils. The current regulations man-
date that the monthly wage of a member of a supervisory council cannot exceed the average 
monthly salary in the enterprise’s sector, i.e. in the year 2004 around 2,438 PLN (at that time 
about 542 EURO).17  
This legislation fundamentally affected politicians who had been treating supervisory councils 
as their personal sinecures, which is strikingly visible after each parliamentary election. For 
politicians, entry into a supervisory council frequently becomes a springboard for running a 
private business in the sector.  
Respondents commented on the effects of the act as follows: 
Truthfully speaking, it’s fiction and everybody knows it perfectly well. In regards to the 
coal companies, there is nothing simpler than to check the registries in the Economic 
Court: the same names find themselves in councils and administrative units. Well, I’m 
personally curious if they waited out the statutory limits. This is nothing, it’s not a con-
cern in this or that company, because what kind of competition exists between them any-
how? But I do know that there were guys in the company and in the mines and they took 
money for it. Well, a little will pile up. The issue is with something else in various private 
companies who work for mining. The example comes from the top! 
                                                     
17 Data from: GUS (Central Statistical Office) http://www.stat.gov.pl 
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A member of a supervisory council of one of the organs under research argued: 
Nobody at this moment sits on supervisory councils because of income reasons. At least 
from my experience it results in the fact that for some, it’s ‘money for nothing’. In my 
opinion, and I stress this is just a private opinion, membership in a council ensures a se-
ries of privileges. It is widely known, anyhow, that this results from the fact (on ‘The Ad-
justement of the Coal Mining Industry to the Functioning in Conditions of a Market 
Economy’) that ministries, for example the Ministry of Finance, have their plugs in the 
councils. This is even understandable. However, politicians treat the supervisory councils 
like their personal sinecures. This is evident after each election. There are, in supervisory 
councils, people who limit themselves to taking a salary but there are also players to be 
found who try to squeeze something out for themselves. In this case, this is the truth, for 
the representatives of the workers things are clear: they are chosen to realize the inter-
ests of those who they represent. Anyhow, these type are also not holy and it’s not possi-
ble to generalize. The issue is the fact that the councils become a place to fight and pur-
sue particular interests, games with the management. There are many methods to re-
compensate for favorability and assistance. 
A subsequent respondent claimed: 
(…) My feeling is the statute (on ‘The Salaries of Persons Managing Certain Legal Sub-
jects’) in large measure hits politicians. Up until now, this was simply a constant prac-
tice, that these guys had chairs in several councils. I would call this a reward for those 
who are obedient. This is now supposedly going to end. Will it end? Who’s going to check 
it? Is there any central register? Certainly not. Occasionally, there will be some sort of 
minor scandal that might explode because of this, if somebody has bad luck like a prob-
ing journalist won’t let go or something. The case’s neck will be wrung quietly. 
A member of a supervisory council of one company (on behalf of the workers) grasped the 
situation with these words: 
Somehow the politicians will work something out. Some type of commission here, a firm 
there, a partnership. They’ve already had a chance to see what and where. Don’t worry 
your head about it. 
Another respondent said: 
Until this time, under the assumption that they did not fall under the act on ‘The Limita-
tion of Economic Activities Undertaken by Individuals Fulfilling Public Functions’ (i.e., 
for example coal company management), these types of limits already existed, of course, 
since 1997, as to the number of [permissible] functions, of course, and as to income. It 
was possible to fulfill, of course, 2 additional functions on behalf of the State Treasury. 
Except that this act did not precisely define if it concerned the management boards or su-
pervisory councils and in what eventual combination. I personally believe, as I inter-
preted it, that it pertains to the supervisory council. These additional (to the main) func-
tions were payable up to an amount of 4 times the average pay in the industry. (…) This 
means theoretically, of course, there could have been more allotted, but this would have 
immediately led to the taxation department, to the budget, this surplus. And if somebody 
was not affected by statutory limits, then, well, he had an Eldorado and ‘live and let live’ 
attitude. Currently, the case is clear, one council and one salary, but again, the statute on 
caps on ‘The Salaries of Managing Persons’ but in sum, right, is also imprecise. Particu-
larly, in regards to changes in the act on ‘The Limitation of Activities’. (…) I believe and 
I will tell you that my opinion, of course, is not impersonal: I believe that the recently 
passed law is messy. It’s imprecise. This has characteristics of purposeful activity. 
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7.2 Additional Sources of Income in Mining  
Consulting and Advisory Bodies  
Aside from fundamental income sources, key actors in the sector reap income via alternative 
means, e.g. from sitting on a series of commissions or from activities in consulting and advisory 
bodies. The first group of people active in these types of bodies are actually comprised of policy 
makers from the mining sector: members of coal company management boards, supervisory 
councils and directors of mines. Individuals nursing key positions in the sector are frequently 
invited to serve as consultants, wherein they appear in the role of impartial experts, though pre-
cisely because of the positions they occupy, their objectivity is called into question. 
It is given to observation that there exists a tendency for people who administer rela-
tively, I would say, prominent functions to be customarily invited to consulting bodies. 
They are invited, and obviously paid for their expert activity, let’s call it that. (…) Well, 
there is a certain problem even here. Whose interest do they represent? Because here a 
conflict is almost certain to arise. 
Another interviewee argues, however: 
Well, I’m not particularly surprised because for the good of the case, who is supposed to 
be in these commissions, who has the fundamentals, the work experience and practical 
knowledge?  
Activity in different types of expert and advisory bodies constitutes a method for „hibernating“ 
individuals periodically removed from strategic positions, due, for example, to the need to effect 
certain personnel changes in association with parliamentary election results or as the result of 
personal contestations between primary actors in the sector. Professional solidarity, in the ma-
jority of cases, does not allow individuals occupying responsible positions, up until a certain 
point, to plunge into non-existence: Their knowledge and professional experience could still be 
helpful. Since they have reached such a high position, they must represent a certain level of 
expertise, is the accepted line of thinking in the environment. 
A person who has passed all levels of his career has to have some basis for this. You 
could speak of arrangements, which raised him in individual cases. But generally he has 
to represent something with himself. If he loses his position, well, then you need to create 
a position for him. You are laughing but I’m speaking completely seriously.  
A subsequent respondent said: 
They’re not going to let anybody perish. There are so many consulting bodies, PARG 
(State Coal Mining Restructuring Agency), GIG (Central Mining Institute), and WUG 
(State Mining Authority); companies continuously give work in evaluations, opinions, dif-
ferent documentations and plans. If not in a supervisory committee, then here or there. 
Nobody has died of hunger. Well, maybe if he was seriously mischievous. If somebody 
plays dirty then there are methods to, let me say, get him out. You could deconstruct a 
person because here everybody …. That’s why it practically never happens. 
Work in consulting bodies or different types of commissions allows for survival from a finan-
cial point of view. From a different point of view, it maintains a professional preparedness in 
the event of change. It prevents one from falling out of the game. 
I personally believe that it’s very good that practical people with a wide range of experi-
ence are taken advantage of, people who, due to various circumstances, are not on the 
candelabrum at the moment. And this doesn’t fall under the rubric of ‘they won’t let their 
own die’, you know; it’s only it’s only perceived that way. 
To summarize, it is worth noting the magnitude of sums spent by mining for consulting ser-
vices. In 2000, mining companies spent 64.3 million PLN (at that time about 16 million EURO) 
for expertise, analysis and the different types of studies.  
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7.3 Additional Sources of Income in Mining  
The Relationship of Mining Companies to Private Businesses  
The relationship between coal companies and mines with private enterprises functioning in the 
mining environment deserves a separate discussion, with consideration of the myriad corrupt 
practices taking place on the border of the public and private sectors. Information obtained from 
informal interviews has found confirmation in the reports of NIK (Supreme Chamber of Con-
trol).18  
Research confirms that a significant portion of private firms interested in performing various 
types of services for coal companies (such as supplying equipment and also acting as intermedi-
aries in coal sales, debt operations as well as barter trade) belongs to members of the mining 
establishment and representatives of the political world. Through coal companies public money 
is being doled out equally to private firms and individuals, including politicians.  
The law of 08.21.1997 is thereby being bypassed [“The Limitation of Economic Activities Un-
dertaken by Individuals Fulfilling Public Functions” (Dz.U.97.106.679 with later changes 
Dz.U.00.26.306)]. The “Public Procurement” act of 06.10.1994 (Dz.U.98.119.773 with later 
changes Dz.U.00.12.136) is also being violated; almost all common tender procedures are aban-
doned or they are manipulated so that a firm which is personally tied to some key policy maker 
in the sector wins the bid.  
From information gleaned from casual interviews it can be concluded that these are not isolated 
occurrences. There is no means, however, of estimating how many prominent actors in the sec-
tor are shareholders of private firms supplying equipment or providing services for mining. Re-
spondents indicate: 
This is continuous practice. If (the members of the company management) are not owners 
(of private firms) officially, because they cannot be, the firm is registered to someone in 
the family, whoever. Everybody knows anyhow what’s going on here and how everything 
works. Various financial moves can be made; capitalizing, buying and selling. 
For example, NIK (Supreme Chamber of Control) has noted that in the Rybnicka Coal Com-
pany there have been cases of equipment repair fees which were higher than the cost of new 
machinery.19 In the transactions, one of the dependent companies served as an intermediary, of 
which a co-owner was the then president of the Rybnicka Coal Company and later members of 
his family. RCC, by bypassing the bidding procedures, procured from this firm a nationally 
produced repaired chain-and-flight conveyor, the price of which was higher than that of a simi-
lar device which could have been bought new directly from the manufacturer. This same firm, 
in which shares were held by the president of the company’s son, mediated in the purchase 
without bidding on subsequent specialized equipment, taking an artificially higher provision.  
The respondents described the practice wherein a private firm, in which one of the members of a 
given coal company holds shares, provides services for a mine belonging to a different com-
pany. Subsequently, a private company tied by family relations with the president of this com-
pany mediates, for example, in the sale of specialty equipment to the first company. 
This is safe; why do we need the kind of scandals Rybnicka had? Well, of course, in this 
case the question of trust comes into consideration, that I make it easier for you at my 
                                                     
18 See among others: NIK (Supreme Chamber of Control) reports „Informacja o wynikach kontroli efektywności 
zakupów maszyn i urządzeń oraz technologii w górnictwie węgla kamiennego” 236/97/P97/185/LKA, „Informacja o 
wynikach kontroli przyznawania i wykorzystywania dotacji budżetowych dla górnictwa węgla kamiennego” 
59/98/P97/066/DGI, „Informacja o wynikach kontroli restrukturyzacji finansowej i organizacyjnej górnictwa węgla 
kamiennego w latach 1990–2001” 178/2002/P01/146/LKA. 
19 NIK (Supreme Chamber of Control) report „Informacja o wynikach kontroli efektywności zakupów maszyn i 
urządzeń oraz technologii w górnictwie węgla kamiennego” 236/97/P97/185/LKA. 
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place and you, on your part, subsequently make it easier for me in your place. Everything 
is in accordance with the law. The tender, no shares or other non-transparencies. There 
are no suspicions. In case of inspection the case is clean. NIK (Supreme Chamber of 
Control) visited us and what? And nothing. And who stands behind it, well, we all know. 
(…) From a different perspective, let’s be honest, what kind of guarantee do we have that 
a different firm would be better? It’s easy to cast accusations. This is high quality equip-
ment. In an offer based on many details, there is no way of telling who comes out in the 
process. There are a hundred ways that they could cut on us. 
It also happens that in the case of public tender the chosen bidders have earlier access to specific 
information about the object being ordered as well as the system of estimating offers. One of the 
businessmen said: “The issue is in acquiring tips on what the competition has in their offer. 
Then we can shoot off a quote. We simply need access to information.” Another producer 
stated: 
It sometimes happens that the criteria for assessment and offers are formulated under 
(the characteristics of) a specific firm. Because this firm, for example, is tied, in some 
way, to some honcho. It’s a friend or family, these kinds of situations happen. In such a 
case, there is generally no reason to waste time (to enter a bid). 
Another supplier stated: 
What do you do to cast aside firms starting out in a public tender, a firm which gives ex-
ceptional conditions and according to all criteria should win, but can’t because firm X is 
also involved, in which the president (of the coal company) has shares? Let us exchange 
the president with the director because it would immediately be evident who I’m talking 
about and why. (…) So what do you do? A few days before the final deadline, or a day 
before the deadline to submit the offer, the bidder is informed that in the submitted offer 
there are formal inaccuracies. Whatever, bad commas, a lack of some sort of informa-
tion, about which there was no earlier discussion or the expectation of complying with 
new data, some type which are generally insignificant, it wasn’t formulated in clear con-
ditions. It’s too late to do anything. But this is OK anyway. Most frequently the offer is 
simply cast aside and in the explanation they write that it doesn’t fulfill formal criteria. 
In the context of relations between private firms performing services and delivering equipment 
for mining, the problem of financing political parties was indicated. For example, owners of 
firms entering public tender during election periods are sometimes discreetly informed that fi-
nancial contributions to an election fund of one of the presidential candidates will improve their 
chances in the auction. One of the interviewees related the following: 
I was discreetly informed, not even that, that I was informed – a certain, one could say, 
loose remark came that it’s necessary to provide support. That of course, I have good 
chances of winning the bid and the offer was well prepared and so forth. Only that it 
would be appropriate to listen. Well, it was simply concerning the deposit of a significant, 
at least for me, pretty significant sum from the contract to the election fund (of one of the 
candidates entering the presidential elections.) Well, it was necessary to calculate for 
oneself. It wasn’t the deal of a lifetime. Only that, theoretically, I could ignore such a 
suggestion; in principle, it was formulated in a very discreet manner. I didn’t have to sign 
anything. But, if I don’t do it, then I’m finished. Simply put, I don’t have a chance for any 
contract. The end. 
Another respondent claimed: 
It’s done like this, that, for example, I as a firm could allocate a sum of money, deposit it 
in a fund, let’s assume SLD (Democratic Left Alliance) or AWS (Solidarity Electoral Ac-
tion), or it’s possible to play it so that I as a private person deposit it or let’s assume the 
co-owner. In my case, there are two shareholders, so as private individuals. Am I al-
lowed? Allowed! I get an order, sign a contract and I get so and so much for a job and I 
give away, well, this depends on what was agreed to. (…) Now they supposedly want to 
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change this in the Seym (lower house of the Polish Parliament), new regulations for fi-
nancing (political parties) are to be introduced, everything transparent. Parties are sup-
posed to be financed from the budget, I recently heard about this kind of proposition. 
A subsequent interviewee discussed: 
It used to look like this, that they (the coal company or mine) could themselves deposit 
money to a foundation, which, let us say, functioned next to some kind of political party. 
And it appears that they were still able to deduct it from their taxes. Since they took away 
this opportunity from them, I’m talking about subsidization, these kinds of things are 
taken care of by private firms (contactors or suppliers). These could also reduce their 
taxes. (…) I heard this was the case, and no one personally suggested this to me, but I’m 
just a small fry. In firm X, for instance, shares are held by the son of president Y, well, it’s 
probably significantly simpler this way. Without stress. 
It was indicated that: 
There exists a firm X in the town of Katowice. The owners of this firm commonly repre-
sent themselves as people of the left. Well, and there you go, they now get (several months 
after the victory of the left in the parliamentary elections) contracts in almost all compa-
nies. And if you take a closer look, they shouldn’t, because they, for example, employ 
former miners (which is illegal). 
Similarly, organizations of the coal market and the principles of receivables turnover create 
opportunities for covert financing of political parties as well as taking advantage of unsubstanti-
ated financial proceeds by people committed to this type of activity. Opinions have developed 
that: 
Around mining there has arisen a multitude of private firms which simply belong to peo-
ple, I will say generally, from political circles. From this or that type of distribution they 
have entered, let’s assume, into the supervisory councils. They’ll make their way a little, 
get wind of the opportunities that are hidden in mining and they have simply fitted them-
selves into the structure. As one political scientist mentioned, you see, I like to read vari-
ous things in my free time, political capitalism, that politics is a certain kind of trampo-
line to jump into the economy. (…) I have a series of examples. Being an intermediary, 
you know, in the purchase of equipment, the business of receivables, these barter transac-
tions of course. In its time, this was unbelievable money. What kind of fortunes grew on 
this! Now this is regulated. The coal trade. Also limited now, coal companies are obliged 
to sell coal directly to the power plants, but still not long ago there was a whole chain of 
intermediaries. 
A different respondent claimed that: 
A stream of money from the coal trade flows to politics. The feather-bedding of Wę-
glokoks, this is the most wanted goal. Coal companies can have, I don’t know what kind 
of debts, and they have debts, Węglokoks is always ahead. 
Coal companies, in spite of legal regulations, use this so-called chain of intermediaries between 
producers and end purchasers of coal. It amounts to deception consisting of the fraudulent low-
ering of classes of coal. Respondents indicated a series of inconsistencies connected with the 
trade of coal as well as turnover of receivables. „Here there are possibilities to be found, in the 
class of coal for example, intermediary linkages, brokers, contracts with electric companies, 
postponing payment terms for companies.“ A subsequent interviewee suggested: 
I will only generally say that, firstly, you can cheat on the class of coal because it’s prac-
tically impossible to check when the coal lays in a dump if it’s from this colliery or from 
that one or if it was already burned. This is of course sporadically investigated but who 
can be sure? The second thing is intermediation – here it is possible to stir things up with 
price reductions and payment terms. Well, and remunerations. Or compensations, if you 
have good contacts, then really. (…) This is all based on personal contacts. 
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Some of these accusations found confirmation in the NIK (Supreme Chamber of Control) re-
ports.20 Coal companies, in order to obtain customers, commonly utilized lengthening of pay-
ment terms and gave additional price reductions. They stepped back from direct sales of coal to 
big buyers with the power plants and steelworks included. In turn, transactions were established 
with them with the participation of intermediaries. NIK claims that the introduction of addi-
tional price reductions and excessive extensions of payment deadlines for delivered coal, relin-
quishing interest due on debts, even reducing main receivables and allowing for intermediary 
linkages with the sale of coal to large buyers created a corruption-prone situation. According to 
NIK, the practice of artificially lowering prices of coal by producers by reducing its quality has 
been limited. One of the respondents stated at the same time that: 
These are things which are in practice difficult to inspect. The coal left the mine, was laid 
on a dump at a contractor, perhaps this is no longer the same coal, that one has already 
been burned. But less of it was used because it was of better quality, right? Meaning 
there is a surplus. That’s it. 
Private firms bought the receivables of coal companies for a fraction of their value to subse-
quently sell them back to companies for a considerably higher price. One of the respondents 
commented: 
Well, these kind of things are going to be difficult to prove. The price of these types of 
outstanding receivables varies; it depends precisely on the chance that there is an oppor-
tunity to sell it back to the company, or if some type of opportunities for compensation 
are developing, somebody there has a connection with a steelwork, it’s different. (…) 
Really, it’s very different. It’s not possible to say in general. For example, intermediaries 
pay (for receivables) from 50–60 percent (of their value). Companies buy out receivables 
for some part of their value, well maybe not 100 percent but definitely higher than the 
price at which the intermediary bought it. This is what this is based on. But what chance 
exists practically to prove to people (from the management of the coal company) that they 
shared in this surplus? Taking advantage of benefits will be difficult to prove. 
Another interviewee discussed the mechanisms leading to fraudulent practices in one of the 
companies: 
This was working on the basis that the management was not giving agreement to the set-
tlement of debt, even though, from the side of the creditor the freezing of interest was 
coming into play, or the creditor was giving beneficial reductions. Debt was purchased 
by firm Y, and the company bought it back from it, paying significantly more than if it had 
made an agreement with the creditor. Someone was making money on this, that’s evident. 
(…) One more case arose. With a credit for 20 million from BWR (Bank Współpracy Re-
gionalnej), about 20 million, I think. For insurance they gave coal silt twice this value. 
Except that this silt was not yet extracted. The president (of the management of the coal 
company) played a pretty good game. Generally, there was pretty good in-fighting be-
cause the management board did not give its approval. They recalled the management 
board, and into the new one came those who shouldn’t have come. Well, then the prose-
cutor came. 
Another respondent drew attention to the fact that: 
A large number of companies, which concern themselves with the coal trade and receiv-
ables turnover, because this is the type of activity which is linked – well, a significant 
portion of these companies is tied to people who occupy, one could say, important deci-
sion-making positions in mining itself, i.e. simply with individuals sitting on company 
management boards or supervisory councils or maybe a little lower on the shelf, in 
mines. On the other side, people tied to the political world are also more or less directly 
                                                     
20 NIK (Supreme Chamber of Control) report „Informacja o wynikach kontroli organizacji zbytu węgla kamiennego” 
195/98/97186/LKA. 
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involved in this type of activity, this type of people which, however, have something in 
common with mining. (…) These are the facts. What kinds of conclusions come from these 
facts, how to interpret them, well, this is a different matter. There is nothing more that I 
could add to the idea of the saying ‘a bird which soils its own nest’. 
It is also necessary to draw attention to the fact that economic activity around mining is also 
undertaken by mining trade unions. Union companies are a sought-after partner in interests. The 
mines pay contract liabilities to them in a timely manner, as it would be unwise for directors of 
mines to seek conflict with unions. According to very general estimates of the Ministry of 
Economy, turnover of union companies reach 500 mln PLN yearly.21  
Summing up, the relations between the state-owned coal companies and private firms constitute 
a field for many types of corruption. Compiled materials provide arguments for the thesis that it 
is via coal companies that public funds are streamed into private firms and individual accounts, 
e.g. those belonging to politicians.  
8. A Carousel of Positions 
A Network of Flows. Mining and Politics  
From the organizational perspective, coal mining creates a uniquely developed structure. A se-
ries of strategic positions in this structure insures access to power and what goes with it: access 
to money. However, this is not power given once and for all. Maintaining key positions de-
mands the undertaking of many operations. Influence on staffing positions is consistently held 
by several people, which results from complicated, mutually dependent relationships among 
organizations active in mining. The larger the amount of people with whom a concrete actor is 
able to maintain good or very good relations, the greater his chances of obtaining support in the 
event of entry into a rivalry for a subsequent key position. Obtaining support from concrete 
individuals creates obligation towards them. In this type of situation, a quiet norm of reciproca-
tion is expected, whose terms of payment may be delayed over time. The breaking of this proto-
col causes the bringing of sanctions onto oneself, including isolation from the circle of power. 
An exception exists if a lack of loyalty was the result of entry into an arrangement with a patron 
occupying a stronger position.22 In this way, a network of mutual ties and dependencies is cre-
ated. In the process of decision making, then, other than meritocratic motives come into play.  
In mining power circles there are approximately 120 individuals with a similar professional 
biography who met each other either during their studies at the Faculties of Mining at the Sile-
sian Technical University in Gliwice or the AGH University of Science and Technology in Cra-
cow, at some point during their mining careers, in a mining company or while mutually sitting 
on a series of advisory bodies and commissions. Hence, the mining establishment consists of 
people who, in large part, know each other well or maintain cordial relations with each other. 
Outsiders are not allowed access to key positions because in the opinion of the milieu, they 
would not understand the specifics of the industry. The key arrangements of positions in the 
sector are represented by Illustration 5.  
                                                     
21 A speech to the Parliament by the Minister of Economy Jerzy Hausner 09.12.2003. 
22 See: Waterbury J. „An Attempt to Put Patrons And Clients In their Place” as well as Gilsenan M. „Against Patron-
Client Relations” in: Gellner E., Waterbury J. (eds) PATRONS AND CLIENTS IN MEDITERRANEAN SOCIE-
TIES, Duckworth, London 1977. 
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Illustration 5: A Carousel of Positions  
7 COAL MINING COMPANIES
Management boards, supervisory boards
COLLIERES
Directors
WĘGLOZBYT, WĘGLOKOKS
Management boards, supervisory boards
ADVISORY
AND CONSULTING BODIES,
COMMITTEES
PRIVATE ENTERPRISES
cooperating with coal industry
PARG: State Coal Mining Restructuring Agency,
subsequently
ARP: Industrial Development Agency
MINISTRY OF ECONOMY,
subsequently
MINISTRY OF ECONOMY AND LABOUR
WUG: State Mining Authority
 
As one of the respondents commented: 
Let us take notice that policy-makers, people having factual power, are a closed group of 
people. Let’s think of 100 (persons). Let there even be more. This isn’t much. These peo-
ple know each other. They stick with each other. There is, of course, room here for par-
ticular interests but generally one could speak of the common interest of the mining sec-
tor. And in association with the defense of this mutual interest certain decisions are 
made. The sphere of politics has to be in some way allowed access because politics in-
sures this umbrella. So, for as much as it is necessary, some type of donations, let us 
paint a portrait, some kind of donations have to be gathered. With this there is agree-
ment. I’m not speaking here of some type of conspiracy, please understand me well, that 
some kind of long-term strategy is being developed here. No, it results more from a con-
textual situation, the defense of personal interests for my today and my tomorrow. 
In coal mining we can discern a pathological power structure. Gaining entrance to the circle of 
power is not easy; however, once you enter it and accept its rules, it is largely possible to fore-
cast remaining in the structure until retirement. The system of power which has evolved is so 
strong that all state, social, political and economic entities have to take it into account.  
From a long-term perspective, the mining establishment, though not free from political pressure, 
is relatively immune to political shake-ups. Its members want to cooperate with every govern-
ment because they are well aware that survival of the sector depends on the corresponding re-
structuring policy, and frequently on the specific decisions of individual politicians. 
The mining sector maintains in principle that with each authority you have to live well. 
Prominent politicians are invited to large ‘Barbórka’ (coal mining patron saint Barbara) 
celebrations; well, you simply need to give notice to authority because authority likes it 
and awaits it. It is necessary to foster good relations because much depends on it. Be-
sides, you have to pay for peace. Carrying out politics costs money and in mining money 
flows like a big river, not a small stream. You cannot control this: simply stated, full con-
trol is impossible. Trade in coal, these are unimaginable monies and politicians crawl to 
us like flies to glue. Has anything changed after the elections in 1993? Has anybody ex-
perienced great pain in the time of Markowski (SLD member, the author of the govern-
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mental coal mining industry reform of 1996)? And now? A carousel is a good term. To-
day, I’m here and you’re there. Tomorrow, the opposite. There are enough positions. 
The fact is that every successive government causes certain moves and reshuffling in key posts 
in the coal mining sector in the aftermath of parliamentary elections. Management positions in 
coal companies are snapped up by supporters of the winning political power; as a result, indi-
viduals tied with the previous camp are removed to less prominent positions. According to re-
spondents: 
Changes pertain to management boards and supervisory councils. From my observations, 
I could say that those from management sometimes find themselves in supervisory coun-
cils waiting for better times. And even if someone is well positioned, he receives a post in 
the management of a weaker company or simply a lower function in another. X made 
such a journey. He was the president (of the management board) of Bytomska Coal Com-
pany, later in the management board of Węglokoks, and subsequently he became a vice-
president of Katowicki Coal Holdning. Y, when he was called off from Rudzka Coal 
Company (from the position of the management president), he became the president of 
Jastrzębska Coal Company. But there is also a type of practice in which people sit simul-
taneously in the management of the company and in the supervisory council, of different 
ones of course. For example, (the members of) the management of PARG (State Coal 
Mining Restructuring Agency) routinely sits in councils in coal companies. But not only. 
(…) There is also a whole multitude of various functional positions, the type of consultant 
to the president of WUG (State Mining Authority). (…) Supervisory councils are com-
posed of ruling bodies made up of over a dozen people. The role of president and vice-
president are places reserved for, let’s say, specialists with professional experience, peo-
ple from the industry. Next, representatives of the workers, customarily, and of course 
representatives of the ministries, right? And after the elections these are swept away. (…) 
I know an example of a person who absolutely had no ties to mining, well, it is evident 
that in time, he got his own from political distribution (a position in the supervisory 
council of the coal company) which is currently very prosperous and he manages a rela-
tively large private company (in the mining environment). 
A subsequent interviewee argued: 
I see the influence of politics here. We could argue as to how strong. We could say that 
miners won’t hurt each other and that as an industry we have a mutual interest in sup-
porting each other on the surface and these changes (in key positions) are a result of 
these kinds of adaptability mechanisms. De facto, nothing changes and the rules stay the 
same. (…) Personal conflicts (in mining) arise just like everywhere else. I would say that 
an exchange of authority sometimes becomes an opportunity for personal games. Gener-
ally, it is a closed group, governing itself and following its own rules. I am inclined to this 
thesis even though maybe I shouldn’t be. (…) But I see a different danger here. Every-
where you hear about mining barons, interests and so forth. I would propose turning our 
attention to the political class. Supervisory councils, members are called according to a 
party key, sometimes I have the feeling that there is a complete bypass of merit-based cri-
teria. Councils are treated like spoils of war. I would risk the assessment that they are a 
source of financial aid to the political class. But not as much because of the appanages of 
these concrete individuals, because what are we talking about here anyway, the wage 
limits act regulated certain issues. Although I have my doubts about the legitimacy of ac-
cepted solutions pertaining to management. (…) Returning to the issues (salaries of 
members of supervisory councils), there is no money here. I’m concerned with gains from 
corruption. (…) For these people and the (political) groups that they represent. 
The opinion has been expressed that: 
Changes on the political scene force certain personnel changes. This is evident. But not a 
hair will fall off of anybody’s head. A few years maybe, not even four; it’s evident what’s 
happening on our political scene, and we’ve had different experiences here. So a few 
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years and the wheel starts turning to the other side. If you don’t allow others to live then 
they won’t allow you. And this is for one’s entire professional life, one’s whole life. I’m 
not stating that it’s not allowed to have political sympathies; they’re even necessary. 
Only that we work here. 
The results of the network analysis and reconstruction of professional paths of actors indicate 
that the management and supervisory personnel of the mining sector create a closed, self-
reproducing system. Small changes in key positions are the result of adaptation mechanisms 
responding to the needs of the environment. However, inter-systemic rules of functioning re-
main intact.  
9. Conclusions 
Reasons and Consequences for the Occurrence  
of Networks of Clientelistic Linkages in Mining  
In the process of undertaking research, support was found for the initial hypothesis on the exis-
tence of clientelistic linkages in mining. The compiled research material indicates that one of 
the primary reasons for the intensification of clientelistic linkages is the access to a steady flow 
of public monies. Apart from official remuneration for work on executive boards and supervi-
sory councils of coal companies (as well as in a number of expert committees), advisory and 
opinion-making bodies, there are numerous informal and unregulated means to access to finan-
cial reserves, such as launching business activities and reaping the benefits from the mining 
environment. The slowing of reforms only serves to prolong the current state of non-
transparency, which enables unchecked financial flows. A whole array of corrupt practices takes 
place where the public and private sectors converge. The implementation of restructuring pro-
grams could constrict them significantly. For politicians, the privatization of coal mining com-
panies would carry with it the liquidation of staff positions in supervisory councils, which con-
stitute pleasant sinecures and, at the same time, springboards to business ventures. An interest in 
maintaining the status quo and delaying reforms is shared by key actors in the sector, politicians 
and miners. From the miners’ perspective, reform means continued lay-offs, which, in the struc-
tural unemployment context of Silesia, could lead to a dramatic reduction in living conditions. 
The types of clientelism in the coal mining sector are presented in Illustration 6 on the following 
page.  
The existence of networks of clientelistic relations between key actors of the coal mining indus-
try and the sector’s political and economic environment, coupled with mass clientelism, exerts a 
negative influence on the process of restructuring the sector. This antagonistic impact contrib-
utes to the delay of economic transformation in Poland, the cost of which is carried by society. 
Clientelism consequently disrupts the process of systemic differentiation between politics and 
economy, which, according to Niklas Luhmann’s theory of autopoetic systems, is a precondition 
of system development.23 Moreover, it leads to the erosion of relations between business entities 
(as defined in legal terms) and therefore violates the basic principles of free market economics 
and democracy.  
The political cum economic clientelism is conditioned by the system, because to a large extent, 
it results from the exaggerated role of the state in economic life. In such cases, one of the most 
effective methods of limiting clientelistic networks is the privatization of the economy.  
                                                     
23 Luhmann N. SOCIAL SYSTEMS, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California 1995. 
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Illustration 6: Types of Clientelism in the Coal Mining Sector  
SUBTYPE I
Patron
• Directors of collieries• Members of management
boards of coal companies
• Miners and Trade unions
representing them
SUBTYPE II
Patron Client
• Government
administration• Political parties• Individual politicians
• Miners and Trade unions
representing them
SUBTYPE III
Patron Client
• Government
administration• Political parties• Individual politicians
• Miners and Trade unions
representing them• Directors of collieries• Members of management
boards of coal companies
Network connections
between key actors of the sector
occupying power positions in
• Coal mining companies• Collieries• Węglozbyt• Węglokoks• PARG: State Coal Mining Restructuring Agency,
subsequently ARP: Industrial Development Agency• WUG: State Mining Authority• Ministry of Economy, subsequently Ministry of Economy
and Labour• Politicians• GIPH: Mining Chamber of Industry and Commerce• GIG: Central Mining Institute• Advisory and consulting bodies, committees• Private Enterprises cooperating with coal industry• Trade Unions
CLIENTELISTIC NETWORKS
GROUP CLIENTELISM INDIVIDUAL CLIENTELISM, CRONYISM
Client
 
Poland’s entry into the European Union presents an opportunity to restructure the coal mining 
industry. As a member of the Union, Poland will be forced to observe rules pertaining to public 
assistance for the coal-mining sector. The EU allows for the subsidy of coal for certain defined 
goals, such as insuring the safety of independent energy supply. It is not unreasonable to expect 
that EU membership will bring changes to the regulation of the public sphere; and that the ide-
als of transparency and openness will be introduced while the processes of decision making will 
be subordinated to meritocratic criteria and not to interests arising from network linkages.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Government programs for hard coal industry restructuring 
1. „Restrukturyzacja górnictwa węgla kamiennego w Polsce – realizacja pierwszego etapu w 
1993 roku w ramach możliwości finansowych państwa.” (1993) 
2. „Program powstrzymania upadłości górnictwa węgla kamiennego.” (1993) 
3. „Restrukturyzacji górnictwa węgla kamiennego na lata 1994–1995, część II – Program dla 
realizacji II etapu w okresie 1994–1995” (1993) 
4. „Górnictwo węgla kamiennego. Polityka państwa i sektora na lata 1996–2000. Program 
dostosowania górnictwa węgla kamiennego do warunków gospodarki rynkowej i międzyna-
rodowej konkurencyjności.” (1996) 
5. „Reforma górnictwa węgla kamiennego w Polsce w latach 1998–2002.” (1998) 
6. „Korekta programu rządowego: Reforma górnictwa węgla kamiennego w Polsce w latach 
1998–2002.” (2000) 
7. „Restrukturyzacja górnictwa węgla kamiennego w Polsce w latach 2003–2006 z wykorzy-
staniem ustaw antykryzysowych i zainicjowaniem prywatyzacji niektórych kopalń.” (2002) 
Appendix B: Selected reports from the Highest Chamber of Control (NIK) 
inspections in the coal mining sector 
1. „Informacja o wynikach kontroli restrukturyzacji finansowej i organizacyjnej górnictwa 
węgla kamiennego w latach 1990–2001” 178/2002/P01/146/LKA 
2. „Zagrożenie korupcją w świetle badań kontrolnych Najwyższej Izby Kontroli” DSK/2000 
3. „Informacja o wynikach kontroli organizacji zbytu węgla kamiennego w latach 1996–1998” 
195/98/97186/LKA 
4. „Informacja o wynikach kontroli efektywności zakupów maszyn i urządzeń oraz technologii 
w górnictwie węgla kamiennego” 236/97/P97/185/LKA 
5. „Informacja o wynikach kontroli przyznawania i wykorzystywania dotacji budżetowych dla 
górnictwa węgla kamiennego” 59/98/P97/066/DGI 
6. „Informacja o wynikach kontroli realizacji ustawy Prawo Geologiczne i Górnicze” 
200/98/P97/087/DOŚB 
7. Wystąpienie pokontrolne: „Wynik kontroli rozpoznawczej przebiegu i efektów procesu 
oddłużeniowego w Kopalni Węgla Kamiennego „Rozbark“ w Bytomiu, będącej zakładem 
Bytomskiej Spółki Węglowej S.A, w latach 1993–1995” LKA/R/005/96 
8. Wystąpienie pokontrolne: „Wynik kontroli przeprowadzonej w Nadwiślańskiej Spółce Wę-
glowej S.A. w Tychach w zakresie wpływu postępowania oddłużeniowego na sytuację eko-
nomiczno-finansową Spółki w latach 1993–1996” LKA/41021/19/96 
Appendix C: Selected legal acts concerning coal mining sector 
Dz.U.82.2.13 – tekst:    rozp.     1981.12.30 
Szczególne przywileje dla pracowników górnictwa – Karta górnika. 
Dz.U.90.14.89    ustawa    1990.02.24 
Likwidacja Wspólnoty Węgla Kamiennego i Wspólnoty Energetyki i Węgla Brunatnego oraz 
zmiana niektórych ustaw. 
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Dz.U.90.46.269   rozp.    1990.07.02 
Szczególny tryb likwidacji Wspólnoty Węgla Kamiennego oraz Wspólnoty Energetyki i Węgla 
Brunatnego. 
Dz.U.90.46.270   rozp.    1990.07.02 
Powierzenie wykonywania niektórych zadań oraz uprawnień Wspólnoty Węgla Kamiennego 
oraz Wspólnoty Energetyki i Węgla Brunatnego organom administracji państwowej.  
Dz.U.96.115.551   rozp.    1996.09.23 
Szczegółowe zasady i tryb udzielania oraz sposób wykorzystania dotacji przeznaczonych dla 
górnictwa. 
Dz.U.97.113.735 – tekst  ustawa    1997.08.27 
Dz.U.97.160.1081   zmiana     1997.12.29  
Restrukturyzacja finansowa jednostek górnictwa węgla kamiennego oraz o wprowadzenie opła-
ty węglowej. 
Dz.U98.63.410    rozp.    1998.05.08 
Warunki uzyskania uprawnień, sposób obliczania, szczegółowe zasady i tryb wypłacania w 
1998 roku osłon socjalnych z tytułu urlopów górniczych, zasiłków socjalnych i jednorazowych 
wypłat dla zatrudnionych pod ziemią pracowników górnictwa. 
Dz.U.98.63.409   rozp.    1998.05.08 
Szczegółowe zasady i tryb udzielania oraz sposób wykorzystania dotacji przeznaczonych dla 
górnictwa.  
Dz.U.98.162.1112   ustawa    1998.11.26  
Dostosowanie górnictwa węgla kamiennego do funkcjonowania w warunkach gospodarki ryn-
kowej oraz szczególne uprawnienia i zadania gmin górniczych. 
Dz.U.99.47.465   rozp.    1999.04.30 
Szczegółowe zasady i tryb przyznawania oraz sposób wykorzystania dotacji z budżetu państwa 
przeznaczonej na finansowanie likwidacji kopalń oraz usuwania szkód wywołanych ruchem 
zakładu górniczego, powstałych w wyniku reaktywacji starych zrobów, oraz szczegółowe wa-
runki powodujące cofnięcie lub czasowe wstrzymanie wypłaty przyznanej dotacji budżetowej. 
Dz.U.99.52.538   rozp.    1999.04.30 
Szczegółowe zasady i tryb przyznawania oraz sposób wykorzystania dotacji przeznaczonych na 
finansowanie restrukturyzacji zatrudnienia, warunki, zasady i tryb przyznawania, obliczania i 
wypłacania świadczeń z tytułu uprawnień osłonowych i aktywizujących, wysokość minimal-
nych świadczeń i zasiłków socjalnych oraz szczegółowe warunki powodujące cofnięcie lub 
czasowe wstrzymanie wypłaty przyznanej dotacji budżetowej. 
Dz.U.97.106.679 – tekst:   ustawa    1997.08.21 
Dz.U.99.49.483   zmiana    1999.07.01 
Dz.U.00.26.306   zmiana    2000.03.03 
Ograniczeniu prowadzenia działalności gospodarczej przez osoby pełniące funkcje publiczne. 
Dz.U.99.90.1010   rozp.    1999.10.15 
Szczegółowe zasady tworzenia i funkcjonowania funduszu likwidacji kopalń, ustalania wysoko-
ści odpisów i terminów przekazywania środków na ten fundusz oraz ich wykorzystania. 
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Dz.U.99.111.1298   rozp.    1999.12.27 
Zmiana rozporządzenia o szczegółowych zasadach i trybie przyznawania oraz sposobie wyko-
rzystania dotacji przeznaczonych na finansowanie restrukturyzacji zatrudnienia, warunkach, 
zasadach i trybie przyznawania, obliczania i wypłacania świadczeń z tytułu uprawnień osłono-
wych i aktywizujących, wysokości minimalnych świadczeń i zasiłków socjalnych oraz szczegó-
łowych warunkach powodujących cofnięcie lub czasowe wstrzymanie wypłaty przyznanej dota-
cji budżetowej. 
Dz.U.97.133.883 – tekst:  ustawa    1997.08.29 
Dz.U.00.12.136   zmiana    2000.01.21 
Ochrona danych osobowych. 
Dz.U.98.119.773 – tekst:   ustawa     1994.06.10 
Dz.U.00.12.136   zmiana    2000.02.23 
Zamówienia publiczne. 
Dz.U.00.26.306 – tekst:   ustawa    2000.03.03 
Wynagradzanie osób kierujących niektórymi podmiotami prawnymi. 
Dz.U.96.118.561 – tekst:   ustawa    1996.08.30 
Dz.U.00.94.1037   ustawa    2000.09.15 
Kodeks Spółek Handlowych. 
Dz.U.91.55.234   ustawa    1991.05.23 
Dz.U.00.107.1127   zmiana    2000.11.09 
Związki zawodowe. 
Dz.U.01.5.41    ustawa art.2; art.3  2000.12.15 
Zmiana ustawy o dostosowaniu górnictwa węgla kamiennego do funkcjonowania w warunkach 
gospodarki rynkowej oraz szczególnych uprawnieniach i zadaniach gmin górniczych. 
Dz.U.94.27.96 – tekst   ustawa    1994.02.04 
Dz.U.00.120.1268   zmiana    2000.12.22 
Prawo geologiczne i górnicze. 
Dz.U.01.28.303    rozp.    2001.02.20 
Udzielanie pomocy publicznej w sektorze górnictwa węgla. 
Dz.U.03.210.2037   ustawa     2003.11.28 
Restrukturyzacja górnictwa węgla kamiennego w latach 2003–2006 
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